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Procyclical Effects of the banking System during the 
financial and economic Crisis 2007-2009: the Case of 
Europe 
 
Abstract: 
This paper examines the relationship between adverse shocks to the banking system and their 
effect on the general economy in Europe. This topic was brought to the spotlight during the 
2007-2009 financial and economic crisis, when the relatively healthy, at that time, European 
economy was severely hit by the spread of the US sub-prime mortgage problems. This 
interbanking contagion may have been one of the main, if not the primary, reasons why the 
region entered into a recession during the period.  If significant evidence can be found to 
support this theory, it will make the need for more regulations on the financial system and 
stricter capital requirements even more apparent.  The research includes comprehensive 
literature survey on past and recent financial crises, procyclical banking practices and their 
impact on the economy. Then it goes on to developing a theoretical model of the transmission 
of negative economic shocks from the financial system to the rest of the economy. The 
theoretical model is empirically tested on a range of banking specific and macroeconomic 
variables. The results show that a loss of confidence in the financial system and banking 
losses are followed by a significant decrease in the new loans to non-financial companies and 
subsequent economic contraction. Moreover, countries with better capitalized banks 
experienced smaller declines during the crisis and in general Tier 1 capital is correlated 
positively with economic growth.  
 
Key words: economic shocks, financial crisis, banking system stability, procyclical effects  
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1. Introduction: 
Years after the start of the 2007-2009 financial crisis, it continues to impact the 
economies of a large number of countries through its long term effects, and it will certainly 
remain one of the most recurrent themes for economic research in the near future. Because of 
the large public discontent, one of the most important questions to answer is about the role of 
the banks in the financial crisis. However an attempt to present clear results about the US 
economy might prove to be overly complicated since there were many different negative 
economic factors that tend to multiply each other. Scholars at this time try to explain how the 
different issues such as securitization, CEOs’ incentives, government housing policies and the 
measures taken or not taken contributed to the biggest economic downturn since the Great 
Depression in the United States. Nevertheless some European countries like the United 
Kingdom experienced financial problems equal, if not bigger, than the ones in the country of 
origin of the crisis, simply because the banks there held a certain amount of US mortgage-
backed securities and they are connected to the global financial markets. That is why this 
research paper concentrates on the European troubles during the 2007/2009 financial crisis 
that undeservingly received less attention by the academics. The main goal of the study is to 
isolate the transmission mechanism of shocks from the banking sector to the real economy 
and the resulting decline in aggregate output. Eventually this will shed light on the true role of 
banks in the financial crisis. 
 
Currently we know that the problems in the United States started when after a long run, the 
housing prices began to decline. At that point the growth of the American economy has 
already slowed down considerably. Up to this time banks that lent to subprime borrowers 
faced relatively low risk, since even they were unable to continue paying the mortgage, the 
bank could simply foreclose the property and quickly resale it, even at a profit.  The 
widespread practice of securitization and the deterioration of lending standards, which was 
partially encouraged by the government’s housing policy and the quasi-federal agencies 
FNMA and FHLMC, led to broad financial contagion. What followed was a typical liquidity 
spiral that started with decreasing prices of the assets on the banks’ balance sheets. Financial 
institutions quickly responded by decrease in lending, exacerbated by the mutual distrust of 
banks that held mortgage-backed securities, further depressing the prices of the assets. 
However these simultaneous, mutually enhancing effects do not allow us to determine with 
certainty the responsibility of the banks. Nevertheless we can say with a degree of confidence 
that in Europe the recession was imported through the banking system and later affected the 
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real economy, causing the recession here. A smaller topic within the research question is 
about the cause and the consequences of the loss of confidence and the crunch in the 
interbank lending market in the euro area. It directly impacted the normal functioning of the 
financial system. Another such issue was the abrupt stop in the lending to the firms and the 
households. It started an asset market feedback loop and caused the canceling of investment 
decision and even the bankruptcy of many liquidity constrained firms. The radical shift in 
monetary and fiscal policy proved to be only moderately helpful since the rise of uncertainty 
induced the banks to build up excess reserves in anticipation of further decline.  
 
This topic is particularly relevant from several perspectives. First of all, from a scholarly point 
of view, the research will summarize the current body of knowledge on financial crises and 
their relationship with the economy, and will make parallels to the situation in Europe 
nowadays. At the end it should answer the question whether the financial calamities of the 
past several years are unique, unprecedented event for which the regulators and the 
policymakers could not have prepared in advance, or are there comparable historical events 
that should have served as guidance during the crisis. The research will also contribute to the 
exiting literature on the subject by presenting a very simple theoretical model of how negative 
shocks to the banking system end up influencing the investment decisions by firms. It will 
also attempt to measure this shock and its consequences in the European countries during the 
period 2007-2009 by regressing change in GDP on several banks specific and macroeconomic 
variables related to the financial crisis. The results show that loss of confidence in the 
financial system has a real impact on the aggregate output of the economy. In addition 
expectations of the banking managers about the future state of the economy have actual causal 
implications for it. Moreover, countries with better capitalized banking systems seem to be 
more resilient to negative shocks in bad states of the economy and to have a higher growth 
rate in good states. 
 
The next section will be a brief overview of the subprime mortgage crisis in the USA and how 
it was transmitted to Europe. Section 3 will summarize the existing body of knowledge on 
financial crises, banking failures, liquidity spirals and their relationship to the European 
experience. Section 4 will present a small theoretical model of the transmission of adverse 
shocks from the financial system to the general economy. Section 5 is an empirical model, 
designed to test some of the assumptions of the theoretical background. The results of the test 
will be given in the following section - 6. Section 7 is a brief conclusion. 
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2. US Subprime Mortgage Crisis and the European Contagion:  
 Today we can say with certainty that the economic and financial problems that would 
later develop into the biggest global recessions since the 1930s, began after the housing prices 
in the United States started to decline, following almost a decade of continuous rising.  At that 
time the growth of the US economy had already slowed down noticeably and in the early 
spring of 2007 the former chairman of the Federal Reserve predicted that there is a 
considerable chance of a recession by the end of that year.  As Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) 
point out, the initial bubble in housing prices was not recognized by the majority of analysts 
until after it burst and the historically high prices were justified and deemed to be sustainable 
because of the financial innovations, such as the subprime mortgages, and the steady inflow 
of cash from petrodollars and the Asian exporters, such as China. Therefore in order to answer 
the question what the role of banks in the financial crisis was, it is useful to separate the 
causes and preconditions leading to it that can and cannot be attributed directly to the 
financial system. The terms banks, banking system and financial system will be used 
interchangeably from now on since the banks are by far the biggest players in the financial 
system, there is decreasingly less difference between the activities in which each type of 
institutions is involved and, as explained later, the whole system tends to act in a similar 
manner when exposed to shocks.  
 
2.1 Monetary Policy, CEO’s Incentives and Banking Practices 
The roots of the housing bubble can be traced back to the loose monetary policy 
following the East Asian and Russian financial crises in the late 1990s, the attacks on 9/11, as 
well as the US government programs on housing. Taylor (2009) and Taylor and Williams 
(2009) argue that the long period of excessively low interest rates created an inflationary 
pressure on asset prices, especially real estate, and impacted the savings rate of the United 
States while fueling consumption, and this excess was the main cause of the initial boom and 
the subsequent demise. Taylor (2009) presents the results of a statistical model of what the 
housing starts would have been if the Federal Reserve had followed the Taylor rule when 
conducting monetary policy. His conclusion is that the application of the well-known rule 
named after him would result in between 300k and 1 million new housing units less built each 
year between 2002 and 2006. Nevertheless, we should always remember that Alan Greenspan 
was consistently praised for his policies and foresight until the events in 2007-2009. The 
housing bubble was also aggravated by the actions of the quasi-federal agencies FNMA and 
FHLMC, which were strongly encouraged to buy mortgage-backed securities, particularly the 
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ones generated from sub-prime lending, while both they and the credit rating agencies who 
rated the securities severely underestimated their risk (Taylor, 2009).  
 
Nevertheless, these issues are of technical nature and took so long to develop into a real 
problem that they may remain largely unnoticed outside the academia. Since the problems 
first appear on the banks’ balance sheets and eventually led to many bank bailouts by the 
governments around world, the general public was largely left with the impression that the 
‘greedy’ banking managers were purposefully involved in an excessive risk taking in order to 
extract private gains, e.g. performance bonuses. However the issue of moral hazard in the 
banking sector may not be as pronounced as many believe. Fahlenbrah and Stultz (2009) find 
no evidence that the banks of CEOs who had their incentives better aligned with the interests 
of the shareholders performed better during the crisis, nor that the manager who owned stakes 
tried to decrease their holdings in anticipation of the crisis or to hedge in any way. They 
conclude that the crisis came largely unexpected to the top managers as well, who also 
suffered large losses.  As a matter of fact, there are even some evidence that banks with pro-
shareholders board or better governance as measured by the Corporate Governance Quotient 
suffered relatively larger losses during that period (Beltratti and Sutltz, 2009). Both 
Fahlenbrah and Stultz (2009) and Beltratti and Sutltz (2009) conclude that managers took 
actions that they believed would be welcomed by the markets and the shareholders, while  
others even claim that risk taking by a bank is positively related to the power of shareholders  
in the governance (Laeven and Levine, 2009).   
 
Wrong incentives of the banking managers might not have caused the financial crisis, but 
other developments of the banking systems certainly contributed to its severity. Such issues 
were the decline of the traditional banking model brought by the increasing preference for the 
“originate-and-distribute” banking, securitization of loans and substitution of the conventional 
retail deposits financing with increasing reliance on wholesale funding. The high demand for 
mortgage-backed securities induced sub-optimal underwriting standards by the banks, which 
were trying to meet the demand (Laeven and Valencia, 2009). With these securities banks 
created and sold structured products in order to transfer risk to the parties that were able to 
bear it better, such as long-term institutional investors, but substantial amount of CDOs were 
kept on balance sheet, especially in the high risk tranches, as a signal of appropriate 
monitoring of the loans (e.g., Brunnermeier, 2009; Kashyap et al., 2008 ). Thus the problem 
may not be in the post-issue monitoring, but rather in the quality of loans by banks. 
- 6 - 
 
Despite the fact that when implemented properly, with high underwriting standards and 
accurate risk assessment, the practice is not problematic by itself, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Huizinga (2009) discovered that increasing reliance on non-interest generating activities in 
banking system, such as trading, may increase its fragility. However they do not attempt to 
explain why this might be the case or whether it is connected to the generate-and-distribute 
model. Moreover, according to the Basel I accords banks have to hold at least 8% capital for 
the mortgages on their balance sheet, but they are not required to hold any capital for 
structured products in off-balance sheet entities under certain conditions (Brunnermeier, 
2009). Thus the incentive for securitization and relocation of the mortgages is clear, but this 
happens at the expense of the capital cushion that is imposed by the regulators to absorb 
unexpected loses. This is a form of regulatory arbitrage, which can certainly be profitable in 
good times but has a questionable effect during financial crises. Another support for this 
hypothesis gives the result by Beltratti and Stulz (2009) that the most profitable banks 
immediately before the crisis suffered the most during 2007-2009. However, these are all 
circumstantial evidence that deserve further research.  
 
2.2 Market Failure and Contagion 
 Even given the developments in the banking system described in the previous part and 
the macroeconomic imbalances in the United Stated that will be again addressed later, the size 
and the severity of the financial crisis are still somewhat surprising.  The initial problems of 
the banks seemed isolated and arose only in the subprime segment of the market. Even 3 years 
after the beginning of the subprime mortgage crisis the total losses for the banks brought by 
the actual developments in the real-estate lending cannot be calculated with enough precision. 
In October 2008, the International Monetary fund has predicted $750 billion of losses related 
to the housing market, about $500 billion of which were attributed to the subprime mortgage 
backed securities (e.g., IMF, 2008; Hellwig, 2009). Nevertheless, their estimate appears 
overly conservative as the total amount of these securities outstanding in the beginning of the 
crisis was only $1,1 trillion, and the average drop in the housing prices from their peak has 
been only 19% (Hellwig, 2009). Moreover, the average rate of mortgages in foreclosure or at 
least 30 days delinquent has reached a peak of only 14,41% at the end of 2009 as reported by 
Mortgage Bankers Association. Although the numbers are certainly worrying, they show that 
the collapse of the housing market cannot explain the size of the predicted losses, and not 
even the most conservative the estimates of the IMF ($750 billion) can account for the $8 
trillion of wealth lost globally (e.g, Brunnermeier, 2009).  
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The reason for the difference between the banking losses calculated from the housing market 
fundamentals and the prediction of the International Monetary Fund is that the later is actually 
not based on these fundamentals. IMF estimates are made on the basis of the market valuation 
of the mortgage backed securities and when the market for those securities virtually broke 
down their price fell considerably below the expected present value of the associated cash 
flows (Hellwig, 2009). The rationale behind this is that when these loans are held in the form 
of tradable securities, and thus constantly marked-to-market, any price movement 
immediately shows as a change of net worth (Adrian and Shin, 2008).  This led to the banks 
writing off several hundred billion of assets and announcing massive losses. Even in this case 
the financial crisis may have been contained if it was not for the way banks invested in the 
MBS. As mentioned before, many mortgages were transferred to structured investment 
vehicles to exploit the lower capital requirements. The SIVs on the other hand were financed 
with very short term borrowing, collateralized with their holdings of MBS, and needed to roll 
their liabilities up to several times a year (Shin, 2009 ). Faced with losses and falling value of 
the collateral, the SIVs were forced to sell the assets they could not refinance, further 
depressing the value of the MBS in a vicious spiral ( Kashyap et. al., 2008). 
 
Because of this process the market price of the MBS fell below their fundamental value, but 
since many investors started questioning their quality there were no arbitrageurs willing to 
take the risk and intervene. This created persistent short-term funding problems for many 
institutions that when faced with uncertainty chose to hold their liquidity and exacerbated the 
problem ( Kashyap et. al., 2008). The shock to the perceived risk in the system was further 
aggravated by the indecisive actions of the US authorities, which supported some banks, but 
allowed others, like Lehman Brothers, to fail contributing counterparty risk to the already 
existing problems (Taylor, 2009). These conditions quickly transferred to Europe, which in 
general did not suffer from the macroeconomic imbalances that made the USA prone to 
financial crises. Nevertheless the liquidity shortage and the counterparty risk affected the 
European intuitions that followed the same financing and investment model (Shin, 2009). The 
curious development was that the European financial crisis also affected banks severely. Such 
was the case of Northern Rock in Great Britain, which held virtually no subprime mortgages 
or US MBS, but relied heavily on a short-term wholesale financing from the same pool of 
liquidity as the SIVs (Shin, 2009). Virtually all of the major European banks suffered losses 
and wrote down assets because of their exposure to the global markets, inducing the European 
governments to intervene and bail them out in a similar manner as in the USA.  
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2.3 Monetary Policy during the Financial Crisis 
 From financial point of view the credit crunch has been caused by the large losses of 
the financial institutions that affected their ability to borrow and create liquidity. Thus, it is 
not surprising that the main instrument for intervention of the central banks around the world 
was to lower the short-term interest rates and introduce unprecedented capital injections into 
the markets. Despite the large inflows, the banking institutions were still trying to preserve 
their liquidity and cut-back on the lending to the real economy, transferring the funding 
problems to the other businesses (Kashyap et. al.,  2008). As can be seen on Figure 1 below, 
the monetary policy may have prevented more banking failures, but it proved largely 
ineffective in countering the real consequences of the financial crisis and its development into 
a global recession. One explanation of this may be the nature of the crisis, as Kashyap and 
Stein (2000) and Berger and Bouwman (2009) have both found that monetary policy is most 
effective for small banks and banks with illiquid balance sheets. Furthermore, Berger and 
Bouwman (2009) argue that liquidity creation by the large banks that account for 90% of the 
loans to the businesses, was not affected significantly my monetary policy during 2007-2009, 
but they provide no explanation for their observation. However, as the models in the later 
sections suggest, if the shock to the perceived risk in the economy is large enough, banks will 
temporarily suspend lending and build cushions against unexpected future losses, thus having 
a further procyclical impact on the economy.  
 
Figure 1: Excess Reserves in the US Banking System 
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3. Financial Crises and Procyclical Effects of the Banking System 
3.1 Financial Crises around the World 
 Although the recent financial crisis was the biggest since the turbulence of the 1930s, 
its manifestation, at least in the United States, was not an unprecedented, one of a kind event, 
as the general public was made to believe. First of all, from a historical point of view different 
financial crises and banking panics were quite commonplace through the IX and XX centuries 
and even in the last decade alone we experienced the crash of the dot-com bubble and the 
subprime mortgage crisis. Even though every crisis appears to be different on the surface, 
almost always there are certain macroeconomic conditions that lead to building up of critical 
imbalances that subsequently trigger some form of financial disaster.  In nearly every case, 
however, the banking system plays a critical role in both the initial accumulation of economic 
instability and later seems to be decisive for the containment or transmission of the shock to 
the rest of the economy. The theory examined in this research is that the financial system 
prolongs and magnifies the typical economic boom preceding the crisis and then when faced 
with a big enough, sudden shock to the risk in it, contracts the credit supply to the real 
economy, amplifying the downturn.  
 
Although severe financial crises in the past were more typical for developing economies, 
often with fixed exchange rates like Chile in 1980 and Mexico in 1994 (Edwards and Vegh, 
1997), they did not spare even some of the wealthiest countries like Finland and Sweden in 
the 1990s (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008). The conditions prior to them are usually characterized 
by extraordinarily strong economic expansion, large current account and budget deficits and 
excessive credit boom (e.g., Laeven and Valencia, 2009; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008). The so 
called twin deficits are especially indicative of future economic problems. They are always 
financed by strong capital inflows from abroad that fuel consumption boom (Edwards and 
Vegh, 1997). Berger and Bouwman (2009) find that in these conditions the liquidity creation 
by the banks is extraordinarily high, which is related to the credit expansion. Therefore, banks 
not only channel the capital inflows from abroad, but tend to amplify them by taking more 
risk. This leads to even higher consumption and inflation, an increase in housing prices and a 
run-up in the equity markets ( Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008). Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) also 
claim that maturity mismatch is one of the preconditions for financial crisis, but it is always 
present in the financial system so it will be further examined in the later parts of the paper. In 
any case it seems that the economy of the United States before the subprime problems 
fulfilled all preconditions for the typical financial crisis.  
- 10 - 
 
Even though at the dawn of the subprime mortgage crash the United States looked like the 
“archetypical crisis country” according to Reinhart and Rogoff (2008:340), it is much more 
difficult to explain why the finical crisis spread around the world. Here we have to make a 
distinction between the global economic downturn, which is not unusual given the influence 
of the USA on the global economy, and the structural problems in the financial systems that 
caused banking failures, credit crunch and loss of confidence in Europe. As a matter of fact 
there are evidence that at least the early stages of the recession in Europe were also caused by 
the financial system, and did not transfer through the typical channels of contagion such as 
trade and investments (more about it in section 6). On Figure 2 below is given a comparison 
between the United States and several European countries at the end of 2007, based on the 
some of the macroeconomic variables associated with financial crises as discussed above.  
 
We can clearly see that the Euro Area as a whole appears stable and the only country 
suffering from substantial twin deficits is the United Kingdom. Therefore with the standard 
macroeconomic analysis we cannot explain why financial problems emerged in some of the 
countries like Germany, Netherlands and Belgium that had surpluses and low inflation 
environment. On the other hand the financial sector of Spain, which certainly appears the 
most the vulnerable country in Euro Area, was relatively not affected. Thus it follows that 
these imbalances are neither necessary, nor a sufficient condition for a financial crisis in a 
given country. Moreover its emergence and the transmission of the shock to the real economy 
may depend to a large extent on the banking system itself.   
Figure 2: Macroeconomic Snapshot in 2007 
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3.2 Procyclical Effects of the Financial System 
 In order to answer the question why the financial crisis transferred from the United 
States to the seemingly healthy European economies we need to examine more thoroughly the 
operations of the banking system. A bank is usually defined as a financial institution that 
collects deposits from the households and business and uses them to provide loans back to 
these parties. Kashyap et. al. (2002) claims that deposit taking and lending are the two 
expressions of the one fundamental banking activity – providing liquidity on demand. As a 
matter of fact, the whole financial system is built around this provision of liquidity, which is 
essential for the normal functioning of the economy. In the economic literature there are 
strong evidence that the level of development of the banking sector, as well as size and the 
liquidity of its financial markets, are positively correlated with future economic growth (e.g, 
Beck et. al., 2000). King and Levine (1993) also find that financial development is positively 
correlated with present and future rates of GDP growth, physical capital accumulation and 
efficiency of capital allocation. Nevertheless, the so called financial deepening is not only a 
source of economic growth. As we currently witness, in some rare cases it may transform into 
a cause of instability and be even detrimental for the economic activity by amplifying and 
sometimes even causing the swings of the economic cycle.  
 
Since the banks collect deposits, a liability on their balance sheet, and use them to provide 
loans, which enter as assets, they tend to be very leveraged institutions. For example, at the 
end of 2009 the ratio of capital and disclosed reserves to total assets in the European banking 
system (the so called Tier1 capital ratio) was only 6,15% and this is the highest observed 
value in the last decade. As a matter of fact, the financial system as a whole is similarly 
leveraged as it is largely financed with some form of liabilities. However, if the assets side of 
the balance sheet is constantly marked-to-market, as the fair value accounting principles 
require, any negative change in the price of the assets shows immediately as a change in the 
net worth of the financial intermediary, inducing a reaction by the institution (e.g, Adrian and 
Shin, 2008). Since the capital is such a small percentage of the assets, and there are strict 
capital requirements, the appropriate response is naturally to decrease the leverage to 
minimize further losses. Thus Adrian and Shin (2008a) and Adrian and Shin (2009) find that 
level of leverage of the banks is very procyclical, increasing during booms and dramatically 
decreasing during recessions, and positively correlated with the level of marking-to-market 
and the size of the balance sheet. However this has implications not only for the banks 
themselves, but has aggregate consequences as well. 
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Since the banking system, as a whole, has an exposure to the same types of assets, the 
probability that when one bank is experiencing gains or losses at a given point in time, its 
competitors are similarly gaining or losing is quite high. Therefore, the observations about the 
procyclical leverage and its relation to balance sheet size holds also for the entire financial 
system (Adrian and Shin, 2008a). As mentioned above, when the assets prices are falling the 
bank will try to decrease leverage, which can be achieved in one of three ways – by selling 
assets, by issuing more capital or in a combination of the two (Adrian and Shin, 2008b). 
However, issuing additional capital is relatively slow process and in general cannot be used in 
day to day risk management. Selling off of assets, on the other hand, increases the volatility 
and decreases the price of the securities even if it is not a coordinated act by the financial 
intermediaries, but individual decision caused by the market circumstances. This may create a 
perception of increased risk on the markets and will be picked by the risk measures such as 
Value at Risk. For this reason Adrian and Shin, (2008b) claim that such risk management 
tools create spillover effects to other financial institutions and that the increased perception of 
risk decreases the debt capacity in the entire financial system, causing further deleveraging by 
the financial intermediaries.   
 
This behavior of the banks resembles somewhat the manner of operation of traders and 
investment firms that use leverage and margins. However the business of banks, as stated 
previously, is to create liquidity by financing relatively illiquid, long term assets, such as 
loans, with liquid short term liabilities, like demand deposits, commercial paper and repos 
(e.g, Adrian and Shin, 2008; Berger and Bouwman, 2009). The creation of liquidity, on the 
other hand, is implicitly related with the leverage of the financial system, especially during 
times of negative shocks. If the banks use their assets as collateral when borrowing, the 
implicit “margins” in the banking system may lead to mutually reinforcing effects of the 
funding liquidity, measured by the ease of borrowing, and asset market liquidity and volatility 
(Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2008). According to Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008), the 
financial intermediaries will be induced to sell their holdings of assets, which will decrease 
the prices of those assets, further impacting their ability to borrow in the so called liquidity 
spiral. This interaction between funding liquidity and asset prices is a strong transmission 
mechanism that can amplify and propagate shocks through the financial system ( e.g, Kyotaki 
and Moore, 1997; Adrian and Shin 2008b). Therefore the liquidity that the banking system 
provides is also procyclical, high during booms and low during recession, and it is especially 
sensitive to balance sheet shocks.  
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In any case, the fact that the financial system has maturity mismatch makes it very susceptible 
to liquidity problems, or as Adrian and Shin (2009: 604) put it - “any tensions resulting from a 
sharp pullback in leverage will show up somewhere in the system”. If banks are concerned 
about a possible failure of rolling their short-term liabilities they will attempt a rapid 
deleveraging and the interbank lending channel will dry up (Brunnermeier, 2009). This will 
further aggravate the level of liquidity on the market and will create serious problem for the 
more constrained institutions. However, there are evidence in the literature that the excessive 
liquidity creation (Berger and Bouwman, 2009) and disproportionately high maturity 
transformation (Hellwig, 2009), which are both very pronounced during economic booms, 
increase the vulnerability of the financial system to the adverse conditions described above. 
Foos et. al. (2010) also find that abnormal loan growth lead to weakening of the individual 
intermediaries’ risk-return structure. Further support for the theory of procyclical liquidity and 
leverage is given by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008) who find that reduction in capital and 
unexpected shock to losses impacts market liquidity negatively and may lead to spiraling drop 
in it. As a matter of fact, this is exactly what we observed during the 2007-2009 financial 
crisis, but the actual problems for the economy started when the financing issues of the banks 
spilled over to their borrowers, the non-financial businesses (Kashyap et. al., 2008). 
 
According to both the standard Real Business Cycle theory and the classical Keynesian 
IS/LM model, the developments in the financial markets have no impact on the real-economy 
(Bernanke et. al., 1998). However large losses of the financial intermediaries and liquidity 
crunches on the interbank markets are equivalent to aggregate monetary contraction, which is 
followed by flight to quality (Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2007) and decline in the total 
banking lending (Kashyap and Stein, 2000). Thus according to the financial accelerator 
theory, introduced by Bernake et. al, (1996), some small real or, as in our case, monetary 
shock will be amplified and spread throughout the economy by the credit market conditions, 
generating over-proportional fluctuations in output. The reason is that in the presence of 
asymmetric information between the borrower and the lender, the initial shock to the 
economy also impacts the agency cost of lending, and thus the price of external finance 
(Bernake et. al., 1996, 1998). Agency costs affect the risk premiums making them 
countercyclical, which amplifies the swing in borrowing, investments and production 
(Bernanke et. al., 1998). Tightening credit conditions affect the most poorly capitalized firms 
(Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997) and small firms (Bernake et. al., 1996), which is consistent 
with the theory of increased agency costs. Because of the increase in premiums, however, 
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there is a potential causal relationship running from the perception of increased risks of 
lending to an actual growth in defaults and delinquencies in the future. 
 
Nevertheless, in the academia not everybody agrees with the financial accelerator theory. 
Gatev and Strahan (2006) claim that when the liquidity on the market is low and the spreads 
are wide, the banks will experience increase in deposits due to their relatively low risk profile, 
and will effectively substitute credit from other sources. This will not be the case, however, if 
the banks are under stress as well, which is the case during financial crises. Borio et. al. 
(2001), on the other hand, accept the effect of higher information asymmetries during bad 
times, but argue that the financial accelerator is not sufficient to explain the wide drop in 
output induced by adverse shocks to the financial system. Their theory suggests that financial 
institutions consistently misjudge the level of risk in the economy over time because of 
behavioral biases such as disaster myopia and cognitive dissonance. As an evidence for this, 
the authors refer to the procyclical credit ratings, despite the effort of agencies to grade 
through the cycle. Thus, during good time the risk is underestimated, which fuels credit 
growth and consumption, and overestimated during downturns, impeding the recovery and 
preventing even borrowers with profitable projects to obtain financing (Borio et. al., 2001). 
Furthermore, Foos et. al., (2010) argue that abnormal loan growth on individual level is linked 
to looser credit standards and is associated positively with higher risk and loan losses, and 
negatively with future profitability and solvency. Thus financial institutions may have a 
substantial causal impact on the swing of the business cycle. 
 
As we see, the developments in the world economy during 2007-2009 are definitely not 
exceptional and are easily explained by the decades of economic research and examinations of 
financial crises. During this period we observed both troubles in the undercapitalized shadow 
banking institutions, financed with short term borrowing (Shin, 2009) and banks unwilling to 
credit each other because of the sudden increase in risk (Taylor and Williams, 2009). In these 
circumstances the European banking system, which is indivisible part of the global financial 
markets, brought the financial crisis in Europe, despite the fact that there were no negative 
macroeconomic conditions to justify the financial contagion here. Moreover because of the 
large losses of the banking institutions and the expectations that the severe recession already 
present in the United States will certainly impact Europe, they reacted preemptively to the risk 
by cutting lending to the real economy and effectively pushing it into a recession. Further 
evidence for these effects are given by the empirical results in Section 6. 
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3.3 Regulations and Capital Requirements 
 Another look at the regulations and capital requirements of the financial system may 
tell us more about the means to avoid such market disasters in future. In addition, it will also 
give further support to the theory of procyclical banking activities during the financial crisis. 
As stated previously, there is no evidence that “greed” or any form of opportunistic behavior 
by top banking managers is responsible for the excessive exposure to ambiguous structured 
products prior to the crisis. In addition, there is also no evidence that compensation through 
option had any effect on risk taking by the top managers, as measured by stock volatility 
(Fahlenbrah and Stultz, 2009). Therefore, regulators that are currently examining or trying to 
restrict executive pay in some form may be missing the point, unless they are simply trying to 
address the public discontent with the high salaries.   
 
On the other hand, Laeven and Levine (2009) demonstrate that risk taking by the banks is 
positively related to the shareholders concentration and power over the executives. In such 
highly leveraged institutions, this behavior is largely consistent with the seminal work of 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) and the predicted by them moral hazard of gambling with 
borrowed money. In this situation capital requirements may help to alleviate the agency 
problems by preventing the owners from undertaking excessively risky investments, because 
the events of losses become more costly to them (Morrison and White, 2005). Beltatti and 
Stultz (2009) find positive effect of strict capital requirements on banking performance during 
the financial crisis, while Barth et. al., (2004) shows insignificant relationship between capital 
and crises but strong negative correlation with non-performing loans.  
 
Except for capital, the results about all other regulatory practices in the literature are mixed. 
Laeven and Levine (2009) find that effect of regulation on risk taking depends on the 
ownership concentration. Demirguc-Kunt et. al. (2003) also present no significant results 
about regulation when controlling for national indicators of economic freedom and property 
rights, but find negative impact on efficiency of intermediation when regulations impede 
competition. Barth et. al, (2004) argue that restriction on activities is correlated inversely with 
development, diversification and stability, in contrast to Beltratti and Sultz (2009) which find 
that banks in countries with some restrictions performed better during the crisis. In addition, 
Foos et. al. (2010) suggest that authorities should also monitor carefully loan growth as an 
indicator of riskiness of the financial institutions. In any case, more research is needed in this 
area. The next section will present a theoretical model consistent with the findings so far.  
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4. Theoretical Model of Spillover effect due to adverse shock to the perceived risk in the 
economy 
This theoretical model is used to explain why and how an adverse shock to the 
financial system in a country can spread to the rest of the economy, effectively causing the 
whole economy to underperform. It uses a risk management approach to clarify why banks 
tend to abruptly cut lending and increase interest rates when expected future losses and 
uncertainty about the amount of those losses increase. At the same times even profitable 
companies that had positive net present value opportunities before the shock in the financial 
system face higher cost of capital. This forces them to either cancel or if possible delay 
investment decisions. Building excess reserves in bad times was especially evident in the 
2007-2009 financial crisis and was one of the major reasons why monetary policy and fiscal 
stimuli were not as effective as the policymakers would have liked. 
 
Let us assume a perfectly competitive banking market, where all banks are atomistic and can 
supply unlimited quantity of loans at the current interest rate prevailing on the market. Banks 
have two types of assets: M – money, liquid asset, and L – loans, illiquid asset, and one type 
of liability: D – deposits. Therefore for any given time period t the balance sheet of any bank 
will have the form: 
 
1 1t t t tD M L                             (1) 
 
Assets Liabilities and Retained Earnings 
                                               Mt                                                       Dt-1 
                                                Lt                                          πt-1 
 
Where πt-1 is the profit on loans from the previous πt-1= iL.Lt-1. Let is assume that in the 
beginning of period t the given bank starts with loans equal to Lt and money/liquid asset 
Mt=0. At the end of the operating period the bank is left with net positive cash flow from 
deposits equal to Mt; the bank attracted more deposits than were withdrawn during the period. 
Then the bank has to decide how the split the liquid asset Mt between money and loans for the 
next period so that: 
 1
E B
t t addM M L         (2) 
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In the beginning of every period the banks has a fixed cash outflow equal to F which is 
related to costs and withdrawn deposits. The assumption of fixed cash outflows is not very 
realistic but we use it for simplicity of calculation only. If relaxed, it will actually support the 
theoretical results further by inducing even more conservative behavior on the part of the 
banks. In the beginning of t+1 the bank will also receive interest on its old loans equal to 
iL.Lt. Budgeted cash flow for the beginning of t+1: 
 
1 1 .t t tC M i L F           (3) 
 
The bank would like to minimize its holding of liquid assets because they bring no interest 
and give out as many loans as possible since it is a price taker. However if  
 
 1 .t tF M i L          (4) 
 
the bank will be in distress and will experience liquidity problems. We further assume that in 
order to resolve the problem, the bank can either borrow or sell part of the illiquid assets at a 
discount, but in any case there are high costs involved. Therefore the banks will have strong 
incentive to minimize potential liquidity problems. If there is absolute certainty about the 
interest income from loans it can split tM exactly to 1t t addM M L   so that: 
 
1 .t tF M i L          (5) 
 
By doing this the bank will both maximize profits and eliminate any potential costs of 
distress. For a better understanding of the decision process, the order of operations is 
represented visually on Figure 1 below. The model is related more to a strategic planning of 
reserves and capital adequacy rather than to day-to-day decisions.  
Figure 3: Timeline of Operations 
  
t+1 t 
Mt=0 
Lt 
Operation 
Mt=Din-Dout+ε 
Mt>0 
Decision: 
Mt =Mt+1+Ladd 
Settlement: 
Mt+1+iLLt-F 
Operation Decision Settlement 
t+2 
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However there is a proportion of the loans L, equal to t , that will turn out to be a bad debt 
and will not pay interest. Thus the expected cash flow in the beginning of a period becomes: 
 
1.(1 ).t t t tC M i L F                                                                       (6) 
Still profits can be maximized if 1.(1 ).t t tF M i L     , but t has to be known with 
certainty. The bank needs also to make provisions for the bad loans as soon as they are known 
and the new strategic decision becomes: 
 
1 .
E B
t t add t tM M L L          (7) 
Money, at the end of period t, has to be split between beginning balance of money for the next 
period, additional loans and provisions for the bad debt that became known during t.   
Furthermore we assume that the proportion of bad debt t  is not constant, but rather an 
approximately normally distributed random variable 2~ ( , )N   . This will force the bank 
to keep more cash into liquid assets in order to avoid costly distress. Thus for a given 
expected level of   for the next period, the banks will retain cash at least equal to ( ).E L . 
However this will prove to be a costly strategy since the true value of  will be higher than 
( )E  50% of the time and we can readily accept that the cost of financial distress on average 
is higher than the profit earned on loans so that good states do not compensate for the equal 
number of bad states. Therefore the bank will hoard liquid assets until the marginal benefit of 
an additional Euro kept in M equals the opportunity cost of the same Euro given off as loans, 
which is 1(1 )L ti    due to the competitive market assumption (on Figure 2 below).  
Figure 4: Optimal Level of Reserves 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MC = iL(1-δt+1) 
Opportunity cost of 1 
Euro kept in reserves 
Reserves 
MB 
MC MB 
A 
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The bank will choose to build up its reserves of liquid assets until point A, where the marginal 
benefit of the liquid assets equal their marginal opportunity cost. After this point it becomes 
too costly for the bank to lower its risk further. 
 
The marginal benefit of a Euro kept in money equal the marginal cost of distress - K, such 
that:  
 
( , )t tK f S          (8) 
 
where S is the size of the cash needed 1.(1 ).t t tS F M i L     , 0dKdS  , 0t
dK
d   and 
K=0 when S=0. The cost of financial distress depends on the proportion of bad debt,  , in 
two ways. First the size S of the cash needed is directly determined by the realized value of 
 . Furthermore, the current value of is an indication of the expected values of the variable 
and thus determinant of the bank’s risk. Other banks will buy part of its assets at a bigger 
discount or will demand higher premium on loans for high value of  . Therefore the bank 
will choose some level of Mt+1 that corresponds to some confidence level from the normal 
distribution (e.g. for 95% confidence level, Z =1.65 below). The bank, which exhibits some 
degree of risk aversion, will use a “conservative” estimate of proportion of bad debt (9) 
,which is an equivalent explanation of the banking behavior to the MB=MC setting above: 
 
^
( ) . ( )t t tE Z E            (9) 
1 1 1 1
.(1 ( ( ) . ( ))
t
B
L t t tF M i E Z E L        - risk adj. profit maximizing (10) 
 
In a similar manner the bank will chooses its optimal confidence level in a way that it is too 
costly for it to decrease further the possibility of losses. From a practical point of view this is 
a typical tradeoff between risk and return. It is not without merit to assume that banks in 
reality are risk averse, at least to some extent. If they were risk neutral this would mean that 
they will be indifferent between giving one extremely big loan with 10% probability of 
default or many small loans each with 10% probability of default, everything else held 
constant. 
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Figure 5: Shock to the Level of Bad Debt  
 
Example Mean Standard Deviation
Good State 0,04 0,01 
Shock 0,07 0,02 
 
Assume that during a good state of the world the average level of bad debt is 4% with a 
standard deviation of 1%. A bank which would like to avoid liquidity problems with 95% 
certainty during a given period will use a conservative estimate of its level - 
^
( ) . ( )t t tE Z E     in this case - 
^
0,04 1,65.0,01 0,0565t     At the same time if a shock to 
the financial system occurs and the mean level of bad debt increases to 7% with 2% standard 
deviation, the new conservative estimate will be  
^
0,07 1,65.0,02  0,103t     
 
Then combining equations 7 and 10 the bank will lend an amount for new loans equal to: 
 
( ) 1 1 1. .(1 ( ) . ( ))t
E
add t t t L t t tL M L F i E Z E L                       (11) 
However, since 1 ( )t t add tL L L   we get: 
1 1
( )
1 1
. .(1 ( ) . ( ))
[1 .(1 ( ) . ( ))]
t
E
t t L t t t
add t
L t t
M L F i E Z E L
L
i E Z E
  
 
 
 
          (12) 
( )
1
0
( )
add t
t
dL
dE    , 
( )
1
0
( )
add t
t
dL
dE    , 
( ) 0
t
add t
E
dL
dM
 , ( ) 0add t
t
dL
d  , 
( ) 0add t
dL
dF
 , ( ) 0add t
L
dL
di
  
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The amount of new loans at time t is increasing in the amount of money at the end of the 
period and the market interest rate, and decreasing in the current level of bad debt, the 
expected future level of bad debt, the uncertainty about the future level of bad debt and 
amount of fixed cash outflows/ costs that the bank has.  
 
At any given time period t the aggregate supply of loans to the economy, t
SL  , will equal to 
the sum of all additional loans, ( ; )add j tL  , by all banks in the economy. As stated previously, 
due to the assumption of perfect competition in the financial industry, all banks can lend all of 
their free cash at the interest rate currently prevailing on the market and will choose to do so, 
after adjusting for the expected future risk.  If there are n banks operating on the market, then 
the supply of new loans will equal n times the new loans supplied by the ‘average’ bank. 
Since all banks are atomistic and similar in all important aspects, they also hold the same 
expectations for the future level of risk. Thus, the only features, which can vary across banks, 
albeit not dramatically, are the current level of bad debt, the amount of liquid assets at the end 
of the period and the loans outstanding at time t. The total supply of new loans is given by: 
_ _ _ _
1 1
( ; )
1 1 1
. .(1 ( ) . ( ))
.
[1 .(1 ( ) . ( ))]
t
t
En
t t L t t tS
add j t
j L t t
M L F i E Z E L
L L n
i E Z E
  
 
 
  
          (13) 
j={1, 2…n) 
 
Figure 6: Aggregate Supply and Demand of Loans 
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Initially the economy is in equilibrium at point A, where the demand for loans by the 
companies equals the loans supplied by the banks, eq. 13. After that an exogenous shock to 
financial system occurs - * 1 1( ) ( )t tE E   and * 1 1( ) ( )t tE E   . Ceteris paribus, each bank 
will choose to grant less new loans and leave more money in reserves in expectation of 
worsening credit conditions. The new supply function 
becomes
( ; )
_ _ _ _
* *
1 1*
* *
1 1 1
. .(1 ( ) . ( ))
.
[1 .(1 ( ) . ( ))]
t
t add j t
En
t t L t t tS
j L t t
M L F i E Z E L
L L n
i E Z E
  
 
 
  
         . This causes the 
aggregate supply curve to shift upwards. The new equilibrium at point B is characterized by 
higher interest rates and lower level of loans. 
 
The main conclusion of the model so far is that banking credit can ‘freeze’ if there is a big 
enough external shock on the estimate of future risk - ( ) . ( )t tE Z E  . With a certain degree 
of safety, we can assume that during turbulent times both the expected future losses - ( )tE  , 
and the uncertainty about these losses - ( )tE  , increase, thus inducing the given bank to build 
up additional reserves and cut back on new loans. Since all banks are atomistic, hold similar 
types of assets and follow the same decision making, the adverse shock will cause aggregate 
decline of loans supplied and increase in the interest rates in the economy, as demonstrated 
above. Although the increase in interest rates induces the banks to lend more, this effect will 
only dampen the shock, but will not be enough to offset it. On the graph above are plotted 
only the two equilibriums, net of the interest effect. It should be noted that in this situation, as 
the banks forego additional business due to the perceived high risk and uncertainty, the 
financial sector of the economy may in fact declines, which contributes to a potential 
recession. 
 
The same outcome can be achieved even if L is not an illiquid asset but any asset with 
uncertain pay-off and falling price, that cannot be disposed off without additional cost and for 
which the bank has to make provisions against losses. Such were the mortgage backed 
securities during the financial crisis, although in theory there was a readily available market 
for them. In this case there was an additional liquidity spiral in the price of the assets that 
induced the bank to behave in conformity with the model above. Next, the model is further 
expanded by including investment decisions of firms to determine the effect of adverse shock 
on the expected risk on the aggregate output of the economy.  
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Let us assume that our simple economy under consideration is divided only into two sectors – 
the financial system, as described above, and manufacturing industry. The production sector is 
also perfectly competitive and is composed of numerous identical firms with no market 
power. In addition they produce the same identical product and can sell unlimited quantities 
of it at the current market price without any price impact. The companies also face the same 
investment opportunities and have the same decision making process with regard to them. 
Thus they will react in a similar manner to a change in the economic conditions. Each firm 
produces goods according to the following Cobb-Douglas production function, which 
transforms the two inputs – labor and capital into final product: 
 
 ( , ) .t t t t t tQ f L K a L K
         (14) 
Where Qt is the monetary value of the total production of a given firm at time t, at is the total 
factor productivity, which we assume to be constant in the short-run and equal for all firms in 
the economy. However it is increasing with time and ensures that companies will have 
profitable investment projects. Lt and Kt are respectively the stock of labor and capital 
available to the firm at time t in monetary terms. We also assume constant returns to scale, 
thus 1   .  The marginal product of capital is diminishing due the decreasing 
profitability of the available investment opportunities. 
 
Also for the needs of the model we assume that there is a full employment in the economy 
and it is sticky at least in the short-run. Employers will be reluctant to fire employees at least 
initially in order to smooth out their stock of labor through the cycle. This gives us the 
opportunity to treat tL
  as a constant and concentrate on the investment decisions in capital. 
Therefore the production function becomes: 
 
________
( , ) . .t t t t t tQ f L K a L K
         (15) 
That means that companies can control the production level for the next period by selecting a 
level for their capital stock tK . The capital stock at period t equals the value of capital stock 
from the previous period, plus the investments in capital, minus the depreciation on the capital 
stock from the  
 
1t t addK K K D          (16) 
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We assume that the depreciation that the firm faces, and in the economy as whole, is a 
constant fraction -   of the capital stock.  
 
1 1 1(1 )t t add t t addK K K K K K             (17) 
 
Given that the change in output of a company from one period to the next depends only on its 
choice of capital stock, if it does not invest in new capital to a level at least equal to the 
depreciation its output will fall. Moreover, since all companies in the economy are identical, 
when there is an incentive to invest less in a given period than the aggregate output in this 
sector of the economy will decrease.  
 
We assume that in order to invest in new capital, the firm needs to borrow at the current 
market interest rate – i. Therefore, it will invest in additional capital until the marginal product 
of capital will equal its cost - 1dQ a L K iK
dK
    . In order words, in equilibrium the 
marginal return on capital is equal to the interest rate 
________
2( ) .add t t
KR K a L i
K

  . Due to 
technological progress – a, MPK will increase in time and in every period the companies will 
have some profitable investment opportunities. However, an adverse shock to the interest 
rates will induce the company to invest less than it would have done otherwise. Thus, Kadd is 
a function of the interest rate -  Kadd = f(i) and it is decreasing in i. 
 
Figure 7: Interest Rate Shock to the Economy 
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At time t every company in the economy will find it profitable to expand its capital stock until 
the return on the marginal unit of capital is equal to the interest rate - it . At this point Kadd is 
bigger than the depreciation on Kt-1 and the manufacturing sector of the economy expands. 
After that an adverse shock to the financial sector causes the banks to abruptly decrease 
lending. As a result the interest rates at which the firms can borrow increases and the 
horizontal line shifts upward. The new, higher interest rate now is *ti . Consequently the cost 
of capital increases and many previously profitable projects become unattractive. The 
companies will now invest in additional capital only to the point ,
*
add t
K , which is not enough 
to cover the deprecation on capital from previous periods. Thus all companies will produce 
less than they had produced in the previous period t-1. 
 
Since our small economy consist of two sectors only – the banking system and the 
manufacturing industry, then the GDP of the economy is just a combination of the aggregate 
production in them. The output of the production firms is straightforward and the output of 
financial systems is the amount of new loans lent. If there are N banks and M production 
firms, the GDP at period t is - , ( , )
1 1
m n
t j t add j t
i j
Y Q L
 
   or in more details: 
_ _ _ _
1 1
1
1 1
. .(1 ( ) . ( ))
. ((1 ) ) .
[1 .(1 ( ) . ( ))]
t
E
t t L t t t
t t t t add
L t t
M L F i E Z E L
Y m a L K K n
i E Z E
      
 

 
            
The change in percentage change in GDP will be 
___ _____
1, ,
___ _____
1
1 , 1
( . . )
1
. .
t t t add t
t
t add t
Y m Q n L
Y m Q n L

  
  

 where the 
output of the banks is a function of the perceived risk and the output of the companies is 
function of the interest rates. If there is an unfavorable shock to the expected future risk or 
losses in the financial sector, the banks will respond by tightening credit. This will directly 
decrease the output in this sector of the economy. Consequently the market interest rate will 
increase, which will make some investment opportunities no longer profitable. The production 
companies will follow by investing less and thus producing less. As a result, if the shock is 
big enough, the whole economy will enter into a recession. This demonstrates that the 
expectations of the banks about the future of the economy can be strongly procyclical. The 
next section will attempt to test some of the features of this model empirically. 
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5. Econometric Model of Spillover effect in Europe due to adverse developments in the 
financial institutions in USA 
The second goal of this paper is to develop a model of the adverse shock that the US 
subprime financial crisis had on the European financial system, and mainly to evaluate the 
consequences for the real European economy. While in the United States the severe recession 
was a result of the mutually enhancing effects of the decline of the housing prices and the 
financial crisis, during 2007 the European economy was performing relatively well. This 
gives us the opportunity to isolate to a certain extent the role of banks on the 2007/2009 
financial crisis at least in Europe. In a broader sense it is related to the theoretical model from 
the previous section. If we depart from the simplification of   as a proportion of the bad debt, 
but take it as any expected, stochastic losses from operations, then the variables explained 
below may measure the shock to  . In particular the variables EuroSpread, Loans, 
IntSpread and Survey should partially capture both the increasing E( ) and the increasing 
uncertainty about those losses -  . 
 
The model uses data from the United Kingdom, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the Euro 
Area countries, without Cyprus, Malta and Luxembourg, to perform a panel regression with 
fixed effects of the quarterly change in GDP on several variables that should capture the 
impact of banks on the overall economy. Cyprus is not included in the analysis since it joined 
the Eurozone only in 2008 and its economy is heavily dependent on tourism with relatively 
small manufacturing sector, combined with some specific political issues. Malta’s economy is 
also very dependent of tourism and Luxembourg has very big financial sector, relative to the 
rest of the economy. Therefore including those countries may bias the results. The other 
European countries outside the euro area are also not included because their banking sectors 
are dominated by large banks from the Eurozone that either bought smaller local banks or 
established branches. They tend to have relatively simpler banking operations and in general 
did not hold any of the toxic assets that caused the first wave of the financial crisis. 
Nevertheless the banks in those countries had the same undesirable effect, especially on the 
booming economies in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, but under different conditions. 
Therefore an assessment of the role of banks in the recession in these countries should be 
performed separately and is a good topic for a further research. 
 
The model uses quarterly observations of GDP for 17 countries from 2000 to the end of 2009. 
For a robustness test, the same regression is performed only for the periods 2000 – 2006 
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(benchmark Normal Period)  and 2007 to the end of 2009 (Financial Crisis), total of 
680/440/204 observations (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, United Kingdom, Switzerland, 
Sweden and Norway). The model implicitly assumes that the deteriorating environment in the 
European banking system after 2007 is result of the spillover effect of the US financial crisis, 
which is tested in the extensions of the model. It is expected that during 2007-2009 the 
coefficients on the variables will be different or more significant compared to the results for 
the Normal Period. 
 
The Baseline Model: 
( , , , , , )t t t t t tGDP f EuroSpread Capital Loans IntSpread CurrAcc Survey   
There are both banking specific and macroeconomic variables. 
EuroSpread: this is the spread between the 1 year and 1 week Euribor rates minus the ECB 
target interest rate from one quarter to the next. Equivalent calculation is used for the 
countries outside the euro area. An average of daily observations of the rates during the 
quarter is used. This is a proxy of the overall condition on the interbank market. When the 
level of EuroSpread is high, the cost of bank resources is high and it might be the case that 
banks are reluctant to lend to each other. It also potentially captures the increase of 
uncertainty about the future economic development. The predicted sign of the variable on the 
dependent variable, GDP, is negative. Since the European banking market is integrated, 
EuroSpread should affect all countries in a similar way.  Euribor rates and other 
macroeconomic data used are taken mainly from the website of the European Central Bank. 
 
Profit: Is the percentage change of earnings of a given country’s banking system from one 
period to the next. The data is taken from the database of the OECD Countries. This is a 
proxy attempting to capture the relative amount of subprime-related assets and other toxic 
assets that European banks held. Since the European economy was in a good condition prior 
to the financial crisis, it is not unreasonable to assume that banking losses are mostly related 
to the global financial crisis during the period 2007-2009. It also captures the increase (or 
decrease) in provisions for future losses that the banks made during the period or in general 
during recessions. Losses and provision should directly impact the lending behavior of the 
banks, forcing them to increase the margin on loans and thus may have a causal impact on the 
rest of the economy. The predicted sign of the variable on the dependent variable is positive. 
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Since data is not available on shorter time periods than one year, a separate regression has to 
be performed only for this variable and year-on-year change in GDP. This will be done in the 
extensions to the model. 
 
Loans: This is a straightforward variable defined as the percentage change of loans to non-
financial companies from the balance sheets of the banks from one quarter to the next. 
Percentage change is used instead of absolute change so that we can control for the size of the 
economy. The interpretation of the variable is also simple – a decrease in the supply of new 
loans will directly impact investing decisions of the companies. However, a possible 
obstruction of the predicting power of the variable is the idea frequently cited by bankers that 
during a recession lending decreases because of the lack of new profitable projects. 
Nevertheless, this should not be the case in Europe for the given period since we expect that 
the decrease in lending preceded the recession. The expected sign of the variable is positive. 
This variable will be estimated both on country specific basis and for the European Union as a 
whole. The rationale behind this is that the European economy is so integrated that the 
aggregate value may have a higher predicting power than the country specific as companies 
can borrow from foreign banks and domestic banks can lend to foreign corporations.  
 
Capital: This variable is defined as the weighted average of total equity plus subordinated 
debt over total liabilities of the banks in a given country at the end of the period. Data is 
calculated from the aggregate balance sheet of the financial sector in the country under 
scrutiny and reported by the ECB. The variable is a proxy for the risk in the banking system in 
a given country. It will also be estimated both on a country specific and aggregate basis for 
the same reasons mentioned before. The notion behind this variable is that the less Tier 1 
capital present in the banking system before the crisis, the more risky and susceptible to 
shocks it is. Thus, countries where banks were inherently more risky possibly suffered a more 
severe downturn during the crisis. Therefore, for the country-specific variable we have to use 
the level of Capital. In contrast, the change in the aggregate value from quarter to quarter can 
tell us more about the developments in the banking system as a whole. Its sign, however, is 
somewhat ambiguous. During good times and in the absence of financial shock, more levered 
banks should have affected the economy positively, while in the presence of a shock, and in 
the state of increasing risk, those same banks should have a more negative impact than similar 
less levered banks. Therefore, it is possible that the variable will have different signs during 
the normal period and the crisis.  
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IntSpread: is the spread between the interest on loans offered by the banks and the interest 
on deposits. It should proxy for the expected level of bad debt and other anticipated future 
losses supplementary to the provisions in the balance sheets, which are dependent on 
accounting practices and regulatory definitions and thus are not entirely reliable. It can be 
viewed as the cost of financial intermediation, which rises under uncertainty increasing 
shocks.  The expected sign on the variable is negative – the higher the spread, the higher is the 
negative impact on the economy. 
 
CurrAcc: This variable is defined as the change of current account balance as a % of GDP of 
a given country from one quarter to the next. It is attempting to capture the effect of external, 
non-financial system related deterioration of economic conditions that have a causal impact 
on GDP. It is potentially important for exporting countries like Germany, that suffered when 
demand for their locally produced goods and services from abroad declined sharply during the 
global downturn. Since in many places the recession preceded the slump in the European 
economies, it can be expected that the change of the current account balance also had a 
significant causal effect on GDP. With this variable we acknowledge that there were other 
factors, besides the troubles in the financial system, which are responsible for the decline in 
the real economy in Europe. It can be expected that in general an increase in the current 
account surplus/deficit will have positive/negative impact on GDP.  
 
Survey: This is the overall weighted average response to Question 6 of the Euro Area Bank 
Lending Survey “Please indicate how you expect your bank’s credit standards as applied to 
the approval of loans or credit lines to enterprises to change over the next three months.” 
“Easing” is given a positive weight over 3, unchanged is given a weight of 3 and “tightening” 
is given a weight below 3. Survey below 3 is assumed to have a negative impact on GDP 
during the following quarter. The bank lending survey is published in the beginning of every 
quarter. 
  
In order to assess the robustness of the model, the same regression will be run with lag in the 
variables t-n, where (1, 2)n . The expectation here is that as we go further into the past, the 
effect of the variables on the aggregate output should fade off.  
( , , , , , )t t n t n t n t n t nGDP f EuroSpread Capital Loans IntSpread CurrAcc Survey     
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Additionally, in the place of ∆GDP, two other alternative proxies, change in industrial 
production and the level of unemployment, will be used to judge the effect of those variables 
on the real economy. The hypothesis is that unemployment should be to some extent lagging 
and sticky, while the effect on the industrial production should be more immediate. 
 
In the empirical section of the paper, the baseline model will be complemented with several 
extensions to improve the quality of the results. The first addition will be a vector 
autoregressive model attempting to capture the evolution and interdependencies between the 
multiple time series. It may be the case that the economic relationships between the variables 
are much more complicated than the abovementioned theory predicts which can have 
implications for the value of the final outcome. Here a Granger causality test on the two 
different time periods will be helpful in determining, whether the regression reflects just 
correlations or there is indeed some causal relationship between the variables and GDP. A 
natural expansion of the VAR is an impulse response function to describe how the economy 
reacts overtime to exogenous shocks on each of the abovementioned variables. This will help 
us answer the question whether these shocks have just temporary or long-term impact for the 
aggregate output. 
 
The data for the macroeconomic variables is readily obtained from the ECB’s and Eurostat’s 
websites, where quarterly, seasonally indexed GDP and interest rates are available. Data on 
current account deficits and surpluses is obtained from OECD Countries database. The data 
about the bank specific variables related to their balance sheets is also easily found on ECB’s 
statistics section. For the countries outside the Eurozone, the same data can be downloaded 
from the statistics section of their corresponding central banks. For our purposes it is 
sufficient to use the aggregated balance sheet of the financial institutions for each of the 
countries, which is calculated on a monthly basis. Even though this statistic includes some 
non-bank financial institutions, it should still be a good approximation for the role of banks, 
since they control the bigger part of the market. The same statistics for the United Kingdom 
can be obtained from the website of the Bank of England. The Profit variable is estimated 
from the aggregate income statement of the banking sector of each country at the end of the 
year and reported by OECD database. Although many banks operate in several countries, their 
losses related to the financial crisis are typically incurred by their main headquarters and the 
overall impact on the real economy is the strongest at that location. Results will be presented 
into several steps, while gradually adding more variables.  
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6. Results and Empirical Findings 
The idea for the for the EuroSpread variable is taken from Kao and Shumaker (1999) 
where the authors use yield spread between 10-year T-bonds and 3-month T-bill to time the 
equity market on the premise that this spread is potentially indicative of future recession. 
Although they find that this is the most promising variable to time the market, their results are 
still too volatile to predict actual recessions. Therefore,  for the purposes of this paper the 
yield spread is substituted with the spread between 1 week and 12 months Euribor, which 
should capture both the general expectations about the future of the economy and the 
assessment of the banks about the level of risk in the financial system. Of course measuring 
the shocks to risk is one of the main goals here. In addition, it may indicate better the 
underlying processes of the economy, because it reflects uncollateralized borrowing and is not 
affected by the flight to quality and the safety of government debt. The spread is further 
normalized by dividing it by official short term target rate of the central banks.   
 
As mentioned before, Beltratti and Stultz (2009) find that during the financial crisis banks 
with more Tier 1 capital performed relatively better in terms of stock returns and profitability. 
Moreover Holmsotrm and Tirole (1997) claim that during previous financial crises, like in 
Scandinavia during 1980-1990, the equity value of the banking system significantly affected 
lending. Therefore the variable Capital, which is basically the Tier 1 ratio, is used to test 
whether countries with banks that had more capital also performed better during the crisis. 
The level of integration of the European economies gives reasons to believe that the change of 
total capital of the banking system may be important not only on a country level but also as an 
aggregate value.  
 
The variable that measures the interest spread between the deposits and the loans to non-
financial corporation, IntSpread, is directly borrowed from Edwards and Vegh (1997), who 
show that during the earlier financial crises in emerging economies, banks have increased this 
spread to account for the higher risk of lending and this have had a further negative impact on 
the overall economy. A small problem with IntSpread is that data about it is available from 
ECB only since 2003, which gives more weight to the crisis years in the regressions. The 
same problem is in place with the Survey variable. To control for this issue, the first 3 tables 
below report the same period results only for the variables for which data is available since 
the year 2000, excluding IntSpread and Survey. “Eur” is indication of aggregate variable 
and “Domestic" for country specific.  
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Table I 
GDP Growth Rate and Aggregate Variables: Q1 2000 – Q4 2009 
 
Quarter on quarter, seasonally adjusted GDP growth rate, from 2000Q1 to 2009Q4, is regressed using panel data of 18 countries plus the 
Eurozone as whole.  GDP data is from Eurostat. EuroSpread, Capital and Loans data is from the statistical warehouse of ECB, while CurrAcc 
data is taken from statistical section of the OECD countries website.  Initially only the aggregate values of Loans and Capital are used (For EU as 
whole), and IntSpread and Survey are dropped all together, as this regression allows for the biggest number of observations - 760. Reported 
underneath are the mean and standard deviation for each of the variables, the coefficient on the independent variables, as estimated by the 
regression, the t-statistics and the p-value at which the variable becomes significant, as well as the resultant constant term (intercept). 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 GDP EuroSpread Capital_Eur Loans_Eur CurrAcc 
Mean 0.4492105 0.3859676 0.0172118 1.668528 0.0198384 
St. Dev. 1.093157 0.8717334 0.0748084 1.388806 1.799318 
 
Panel B: Regression Results: 
Fixed-effects (within) regression Number of obs      =       760 
Group variable: countryid Number of groups   =        19 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0959 Obs per group: avg =      40.0 
 
Variable Coefficient St. Error t P-value 95% Confidence 
GDP Growth 
Rate 
      
EuroSpread -0.2591057 0.0564407 -4.59 0.000 -0.3699094 -0.1483021 
Capital_Eur 2.095831 0.6123492 3.42 0.001 0.8936748 3.297988 
Loans_Eur 0.1622423 0.0311577 5.21 0.000 0.1010738 0.2234108 
CurrAcc 0.0344875 0.0208145 1.66 0.098 -0.0063752 0.0753502 
Intercept 0.241754 0.073629 3.28 0.001 0.0972065 0.3863014 
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Table II 
GDP Growth Rate and Domestic Variables: Q1 2000 – Q4 2009 
 
The same panel data regression, with fixed effects for the countries is performed again but only with domestic values for Loans and Capital. 
Data used is from 2000Q1 to 2009Q4. The number of groups decreases to 17, as the combined data for the Eurozone is dropped and there is no 
data on the capital of Swiss banks. There are also observations missing for Slovenia and Slovakia until their admission to the EU, respectively 
2004Q1 and 2006Q1. Once again the variables IntSpread and Survey are not explored for the time being as they further decrease the total 
number of observations. The domestic values for Loans and Capital are taken the statistical warehouse of the European Central Bank and from 
the respective central banks of the countries outside the eurozone.  
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 GDP EuroSpread Capital_Domestic Loans_Domestic CurrAcc 
Mean 0.4492105 0.3859676 7.309649 2.452264 0.0198384 
St. Dev. 1.093157 0.8717334 2.45177 13.75123 1.799318 
 
Panel B: Regression Results: 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression Number of obs      =       638 
Group variable: countryid Number of groups   =        17 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0844 Obs per group: avg =      37.5 
 
Variable Coefficient St. Error t P-value 95% Confidence 
GDP Growth 
Rate 
      
EuroSpread -0.3097282 0.0488738 -6.34 0.000 -0.4057073 -0.2137491 
Capital_Domestic 0.1677674 0.0469269 3.58 0.000 0.0756115 0.2599232 
Loans_Domestic 0.0077512 0.0030793 2.52 0.012 0.001704 0.0137985 
CurrAcc 0.0409455 0.0267823 1.53 0.127 -0.01165 0.0935411 
Intercept -0.7183271 0.3509548 -2.05 0.041 -1.407538 -0.0291163 
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Table III 
GDP Growth Rate, Aggregate and Domestic Variables: Q1 2000 – Q4 2009 
 
Underneath are the results from panel data regression with fixed effect for the countries, using both aggregate and country-specific independent 
variables for Loans and Capital. The number of observations is the same as in the previous case, as they are limited by the country-specific data. 
The other variables of the model - IntSpread and Survey are still not explored in this step in order to maximize the number of observations for 
the case under scrutiny.  
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 GDP EuroSpread Capital_Dom Capital_Eur Loans_Dom Loans_Eur CurrAcc 
Mean 0.4492105 0.3859676 7.309649 .0172118 2.452264 1.668528 .0198384 
St. Dev. 1.093157 0.8717334 2.45177 .0748084 13.75123 1.388806 1.799318 
 
Panel B: Regression Results: 
Fixed-effects (within) regression Number of obs      =       638 
Group variable: countryid Number of groups   =        17 
R-sq:  within  = 0.1265 Obs per group: avg =      37.5 
 
Variable Coefficient St. Error t P-value 95% Confidence 
GDP Growth 
Rate 
      
EuroSpread -0.2872094 0.0643131 -4.47 0.000 -0.4135093 -0.1609095 
Capital_Domestic 0.168304 0.0459505 3.66 0.000 0.078065 0.2585429 
Capital_Eur 2.326558 0.6984203 3.33 0.001 0.9549803 3.698136 
Loans_Domestic 0.0072944 0.0030241 2.41 0.016 0.0013556 0.0132332 
Loans_Eur 0.1684677 0.0358157 4.70 0.000 0.0981318 0.2388037 
CurrAcc 0.0441705 0.0262206 1.68 0.093 -0.0073222 0.0956632 
Intercept -1.056101 0.3526835 -2.99 0.003 -1.748711 -0.3634912 
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First of all, the reason to regress GDP growth rate on the same period banking specific and 
macroeconomic variables, rather that employing some lag, is that the financial system is big 
enough and decline in its activities will have an immediate impact on GDP. The same is true 
for the current account surplus or deficit, since the trade balance enters directly into the 
calculation of aggregate output. Moreover, it can be expected that when the non-financial 
companies take a loan from the financial intermediaries, they will tend to utilize it within the 
same quarter, which will also affect GDP growth in the period. Change in lending will also 
certainly impact future periods through higher production and investments. Thus the situation 
with lags in the variables is examined in Section 6.1. 
 
First we see that all of the variables appear to be very significant, but the Rs-squared are 
relatively low, reaching only 0,13 in the combined regression in Table III. The encouraging 
result is that EuroSpread, which is at the basis of the theory about the procyclical effect of 
risk in the financial system, is also significant at 0.1% in the three cases. Moreover, the 
coefficient of the regression has the expected negative sign and remains relatively stable in 
the boundaries between -0,25 and -0,3 with a very low standard error around 0,06. The 
coefficient on the variable seems small compared to the other coefficients, but this is because 
the EuroSpread is very sensitive to small changes. This is because its mean value is only 
0,386 which indicates that on average the spread between the long and short interbank offered 
rates is only 0,386 times the short term target rate of the central bank.  
 
The coefficients on the aggregate and country specific values of Capital are also significant 
and have the expected sings. This supports the extension to the theory of Beltratti and Stultz 
(2009) that countries with better capitalized banks were less affected by the financial crisis 
and that in general the increase of capital of the financial institutions is related positively to 
economic growth.  The domestic variable is more volatile than the aggregate, because the 
later is heavily influenced by the level of capital in the countries with big banking sectors.  
This is evidence of the notion that the aggregate variable is perhaps more indicative of the 
underlying processes in the financial system in Europe that are more complex than the 
predictions of the model. In any case this is the reason why the coefficient on the country 
specific capital is lower than the one on the aggregate. 
 
As expected, the current account is significant at 10% for the entire period 2000-2009, and the 
coefficient is strictly positive. We see that on average the European countries were increasing 
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their surplus with 0,02% but the standard deviation is quite high 1,7%. However the situation 
with the Loans variable is not so straightforward. We see that the aggregate value of the loans 
is statistically and economically significant in both regression and the coefficient is positive. 
However the domestic variable is significant only at 5% and the small coefficient makes it 
economically insignificant. Once again the reason is the high volatility of the variable. This 
should not be the case, because the variable is calculated from the outstanding amounts of 
loans at the end of each period. On the contrary, there are periods in which the domestic loans 
increase or decrease by more than 10%, especially for the smaller countries in Europe, while 
the average values of the two variables are similar. The only explanation of this phenomenon 
is that the financial institutions that operate in more than one country simultaneously shift 
loans between the different branches.  
 
In table IV below are reported the results of the full regression of the model constructed in the 
previous section. The regression is performed on the period 2003-2009 and the total number 
of observations drops by almost 200 which certainly has an effect on the results. The first 
thing to notice is that by including two additional variables and shorting the time period the 
R-Squared increases to 0,37. The main variables EuroSpread, Capital_Eur and Loans_Eur 
keep their high significance level and their coefficients are little affected. The first surprise is 
that the current account has become statistically insignificant, because its coefficient has 
decreased by 50% while the standard error has remained almost the same. The same is true for 
domestic value of capital, which is only marginally insignificant at 10%.  
 
The real surprise comes from the variable that accounts for the interest spread between loans 
and deposits. It is significant at 0,1% but the sign of the coefficient is positive instead of the 
expected negative. This means that the spread between the two becomes lower in times when 
we would expect a higher risk premium to be calculated in it. This is contrary to the 
observations of Edwards and Vegh (1997) about various financial crises around the world and 
the effect of interest rates in them. It appears that financial institutions act more like other 
types of firms and lower their margins during bad times. A possible explanation for this 
discrepancy will be address in section 6.1 after the appropriate robustness tests are performed. 
The results for the Survey variable also provide an interesting result. It seems that the 
expectations of the banking managers about the lending standard during the following quarter 
are strongly, positively correlated with economic activity. This directly supports the 
proposition of the theoretical model that expectations have causal impact on the actual events. 
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Table IV 
Full Model Regression: Q1 2003 – Q4 2009 
 
Below are presented the results from the regression of the complete econometric model as described in first subsection. Data for Survey and 
IntSpread variables is available only since the beginning of 2003 which significantly decreases the sample size and gives relatively more weight 
to the financial crisis years compared to the previous results. Data for Survey and IntSpread is obtained from ECB. 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 GDP EuroSpread Capital_Dom Capital_Eur Loans_Dom Loans_Eur CurrAcc Survey IntSpread 
Mean 0.4492105 0.3859676 7.309649 .0172118 2.452264 1.668528 .0198384 2.8375 0.2133676 
St. Dev. 1.093157 0.8717334 2.45177 .0748084 13.75123 1.388806 1.799318 1.872147 .7203116 
 
Panel B: Regression Results: 
Fixed-effects (within) 
regression 
Number of obs      =       455 
Group variable: countryid Number of groups   =        17 
R-sq:  within  = 0.3689 Obs per group: avg =      26.8 
 
Variable Coefficient St. Error t P-value 95% Confidence 
GDP Growth Rate       
EuroSpread -0.1392332 0.0811168 -1.72 0.087 -0.2986679 0.0202016 
Capital_Domestic 0.0998923 0.0561576 1.78 0.076  -0.0104852 0.2102699 
Capital_Eur 1.715533 0.7734312 2.22 0.027 0.1953566 3.235709 
Loans_Domestic 0.0098558 0.0032503 3.03 0.003 0.0034674 0.0162442 
Loans_Eur 0.1805128 0.0494368 3.65 0.000 0.0833451 0.2776806 
CurrAcc 0.0184992 0.0295721 0.63 0.532 -0.0396247 0.0766231 
IntSpread 0.8554676 0.1531859 5.58 0.000 0.5543813 1.156554 
Survey 2.206437 0.2509015 8.79 0.000 1.713292 2.699583 
Intercept -8.478176 0.71553 -11.85 0.000 -9.884547 -7.071804 
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6.1. Robustness Tests: 
 Tables V and VI below report the results of the same regression performed on the two 
different periods that are somewhat subjectively called here - “Normal Period” (2000 – 2006) 
and “Financial Crisis” (2007-2009). We see that during the benchmark, normal period the 
statistical significance of the EuroSpread variable, which measures risk in the financial 
system, has decreased dramatically. This is not surprising, especially when taking into 
account that its mean value has dropped to 0,11. As a whole the predictive powers of the 
banking specific variables have declined, which is also seen in the almost negligible R-
squared (0,09). Despite this fact the coefficient on the aggregate value of loans is still 
significant at 1%. The domestic value of capital is only marginally insignificant at 10%. This 
means that well capitalized banks and the new loans to businesses are still important for 
economic growth. The same is true for the current account and the expectations of the bankers 
about the lending standards. So far, all coefficients show consistency in the observed signs.    
 
On the other hand, the results from the regression on the financial crisis period strongly 
support the theory of procyclical effects of the banks during the crisis. This is despite the fact 
that the small number of available observations may affect the quality of the results. We see 
that the mean of the EuroSpread has increased to 1,0 and it coefficient decreased a bit to 
negative 0,4 while remaining significant at levels even below 1%. An increase in the 
perceived risk in the economy is indeed negatively correlated with economic growth. At the 
same time the coefficient on the current account has become insignificant, which indicates 
that the deterioration of the economic conditions in Europe did not happen through the 
standard channels of trade or at least that the effect of trade is not comparable in size to the 
financial crisis. The coefficient on the aggregate value of loans in Europe also shows notable 
robustness in all periods, supporting the suggestion of the theoretical model that the financial 
crisis was transformed into a recession through the bank lending channel. At the same time 
the country specific variable is insignificant only at 5%, which is probably due to the small 
sample size and the reasons pointed out above. The transmission mechanism will be further 
examined in section 6.2. 
 
Another particularly positive results for the theoretical model is that the coefficient on the 
Survey variable has become both larger and more significant (at a level below 0,1%.) during 
the financial crisis period. As a comparison, during the benchmark period it is significant only 
at 2%. Considering that it measures the views of the banking managers on lending, we can 
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conclude that either their views became more consistent with economic developments (they 
became better at predicting) or that banks came to play increasingly bigger role in these 
developments through decrease in lending. The average value of Survey is also smaller, 
indicating contraction in lending. As a matter of fact this variable is the most consistently 
robust one in all tests, so the second explanation may indeed have more merit. The results 
from section 6.1 underneath also indicate that Survey does not only measure implicitly the 
perception of lending risk, but has actual implications for the level of new loans to businesses. 
 
We also see that during the financial crisis the coefficient on the IntSpread is very significant 
as well, albeit with positive sign contrary to the initial expectations. It appears that there is 
another reason for the development of the spread. The interest rate on loans to non-financial 
corporations did in fact increase during the financial crisis, indicating higher risk in economy 
and higher default probabilities, but the interest rate on deposits increased relatively faster. 
The most credible explanation for this phenomenon is that when the financial system was hit 
by the interbanking credit crunch, the institutions had to turn to more traditional sources of 
capital like attracting deposits, instead of wholesale funding. For the banks, finding liquidity 
became more highly prioritized issue that their long term solvency and the spread even 
becomes negative for a short time in several countries. Moreover, they could control the 
solvency problems in the short-term by cutting back on lending, while the conditions were 
unfavorable.  Further support for this hypothesis gives the fact that the spread in almost all 
European countries increased in last quarters of 2009 after the European central bank 
intervened on the market by supplying liquidity. At the same time the duration of the period is 
probably too small to account for the long term effects of the higher interest rates on loans. 
 
 Also as expected, during the financial crisis period the aggregate value of capital in the 
European financial system became more positively related to GDP growth rate, in comparison 
to the normal years. This means that in quarters when the banks had more capital, the decline/ 
growth of the economy was smaller/ bigger. However, this observation can be related either to 
banking losses or to attracting new capital, and perhaps even to combination of the two 
effects. In any case the drop in Tier1 during the crisis is much smaller than the increase in the 
later quarters of 2009, giving some support to the later. In any case, the more volatile, country 
specific capital is surprisingly insignificant in both periods. Therefore, at the end there are no 
definite evidence that countries with better capitalized financial system were less impacted by 
the crisis. More research is needed in this direction. 
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Table V 
Full Model Regression – Normal Period: Q1 2003 – Q4 2006 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 GDP EuroSpread Capital_Dom Capital_Eur Loans_Dom Loans_Eur CurrAcc Survey IntSpread 
Mean 0.6727444 0.1129378 7.341517 0.0050264 1.772951 1.649538 0.0200763 2.908125 2.089355 
St. Dev. 0.7427678 0.1874303 2.452239 0.0533335 10.76097 1.128518 1.692039 0.1592519 0.700423 
 
Panel B: Regression Results: 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression Number of obs      =       251 
Group variable: countryid Number of groups   =        17 
R-sq:  within  0.0876 Obs per group: avg =      14.8 
 
Variable Coefficient St. Error t P-value 95% Confidence 
GDP Growth 
Rate 
      
EuroSpread -0.2330393 0.2859331 -0.82 0.416 -0.7964751 0.3303965 
Capital_Domestic 0.1305982 0.0825765 1.58 0.115 -0.0321201 0.2933165 
Capital_Eur -0.4948541 0.9082831 -0.54 0.586 -2.284641 1.294932 
Loans_Domestic 0.0024366 0.0044125 0.55 0.581 -0.0062584 0.0111316 
Loans_Eur 0.1728021 0.0620278 2.79 0.006 0.0505754 0.2950288 
CurrAcc 0.0536112 0.0295329 1.82 0.071 -0.0045839 0.1118062 
IntSpread 0.3477161 0.2662431 1.31 0.193 -0.1769203 0.8723525 
Survey 0.8774145 0.373323 2.35 0.020 0.1417929 1.613036 
Intercept -2.89724 1.663759 -1.74 0.083 -6.175704 0.3812249 
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Table VI 
Full Model Regression – Financial Crisis: Q1 2007 – Q4 2009 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 GDP EuroSpread Capital_Dom Capital_Eur Loans_Dom Loans_Eur CurrAcc Survey IntSpread 
Mean -0.0723684 1.023037 7.241191 0.0456446 3.930399 1.712837 0.0192831 2.743333 1.575083 
St. Dev. 1.521412 1.369798 2.455052 0.1043939 18.61891 1.862036 2.031737 0.2388636 0.6376338 
 
Panel B: Regression Results: 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression Number of obs      =       204 
Group variable: countryid Number of groups   =        17 
R-sq:  within  = 0.4314 Obs per group: avg =      12.0  
 
Variable Coefficient St. Error t P-value 95% Confidence 
GDP Growth 
Rate 
      
EuroSpread -0.3989795 0.100373 -3.97 0.000 -0.5970385 -0.2009204 
Capital_Domestic -0.0691005 0.1252484 -0.55 0.582 -0.3162539 0.178053 
Capital_Eur 4.457842 1.284516 3.47 0.001 1.923099 6.992584 
Loans_Domestic 0.0091679 0.0047439 1.93 0.055 -0.0001933 0.0185291 
Loans_Eur 0.4914043 0.1152842 4.26 0.000 0.2639135 0.7188952 
CurrAcc -0.0238236 0.0513446 -0.46 0.643 -0.1251422 0.077495 
IntSpread 0.730194 0.2885184 2.53 0.012 0.1608592 1.299529 
Survey 2.313093 0.4515118 5.12 0.000 1.422122 3.204064 
Intercept -8.300836 1.241395 -6.69 0.000 -10.75049 -5.851184 
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In tables VII and VIII below are presented the result of the regressions with one and two 
period lags in the variables. As stated previously the banking variables should also have a 
longer term effects, beyond the same quarter. The initial expectations are that these effects 
will have identical sign as in the same period regression, but with size of the coefficients 
decaying in time. We see that this is exactly the case for EuroSpread, which is significant at 
5% but its coefficient is only -0,15, compared to –0,29 for the same quarter in table III. 
However, the variable becomes insignificant with lag of two periods. Another positive signal 
is that the R-squared of the 1L regression is still 0,35 and 0,26 for the 2L. This means that the 
decrease in the explanatory power of the variables with 1 period lag is relatively small. 
 
The same is the situation with the other two variables that were previously found to have the 
consistently strong correlation to aggregate output – Capital_Eur and Survey. The capital in 
the euro area financial system is positively related to economic growth with both one and two 
periods lag at a high significance level. This potentially answers the question about the actual 
effect of capital from above. It does not merely reflect the exogenous developments, like 
unexpected losses, but it is actually a precondition of for these developments. Its coefficient is 
very little changed from the results in table 3 indicating stable, long-term relationship. In 
addition, the domestic value of the capital is even more significant, further supporting the 
theory that capitalized banks are precondition for growth. The coefficient on the Survey 
variable is also significant with 1 and 2 periods lag, and slightly decreasing with time. Thus, it 
is the variable the most closely matches the initial expectations. Moreover, it gives robust 
evidence that the views that managers hold on the economy have causal impact on it, not only 
in the following quarter, but with certain long-term impact as well. Therefore, if the banks are 
worried about the future outlook of the economy, they will tighten lending standards in 
anticipation, which will have an actual negative causal impact on the future. 
 
The full model regression has also been performed with two other dependent variables – 
unemployment and total industrial production. The results are found in Appendix III. The 
unemployment is correlated with Loans_Eur, CurrAcc and Survey, but many of the 
significant variables with 1 period lag have the opposite of the expected signs. On the other 
hand the industrial production behaves almost exactly as the GDP growth rate and is well 
correlated to Capital, Loans_Eur, Survey and CurrAcc, both in the same period and with 
lag. The next subsections will explore different sides of the transmission mechanism from 
shock to the perceived risk in the economy to decline in economic activity. 
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Table VII 
Full Model Regression : Q2 2003 – Q4 2009 1 Period Lag 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 GDP EuroSpread Capital_Dom Capital_Eur Loans_Dom Loans_Eur CurrAcc Survey IntSpread 
Mean 0.4492105 0.3859676 7.309649 .0172118 2.452264 1.668528 .0198384 2.8375 0.2133676 
St. Dev. 1.093157 0.8717334 2.45177 .0748084 13.75123 1.388806 1.799318 1.872147 .7203116 
 
Panel B: Regression Results: 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression Number of obs      =       438 
Group variable: countryid Number of groups   =        17 
R-sq:  within  = 0.3486 Obs per group: avg =      25.8 
 
Variable Coefficient L1 St. Error t P-value 95% Confidence 
GDP Growth Rate       
EuroSpread -0.1466978 0.0744496 -1.97 0.049 -0.2929124 -0.0004832 
Capital_Domestic 0.1865276 0.0492129 3.79 0.000 0.0898765 0.2831787 
Capital_Eur 1.295674 0.7401575 1.75 0.081 -0.1579498 2.749299 
Loans_Domestic -0.0053766 0.0034581 -1.55 0.121 -0.0121681 0.0014149 
Loans_Eur 0.0715481 0.037871 1.89 0.059 -0.0028282 0.1459245 
CurrAcc -0.0449097 0.0277581 -1.62 0.106 -0.0994249 0.0096054 
IntSpread 0.5428457 0.1643383 3.30 0.001 0.219802 0.8658895 
Survey 3.052693 0.2666291 11.45 0.000 2.528573 3.576812 
Intercept -9.891067 0.7597681 -13.02 0.000 -11.38456 -8.397572 
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Table VIII 
Full Model: Q3 2007 – Q4 2009 2 Periods Lag 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 GDP EuroSpread Capital_Dom Capital_Eur Loans_Dom Loans_Eur CurrAcc Survey IntSpread 
Mean 0.4492105 0.3859676 7.309649 .0172118 2.452264 1.668528 .0198384 2.8375 0.2133676 
St. Dev. 1.093157 0.8717334 2.45177 .0748084 13.75123 1.388806 1.799318 1.872147 .7203116 
 
Panel B: Regression Results: 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression Number of obs      =       421 
Group variable: countryid Number of groups   =        17 
R-sq:  within  = 0.2631 Obs per group: avg =      24.8 
 
Variable Coefficient L2 St. Error t P-value 95% Confidence 
GDP Growth 
Rate 
      
EuroSpread -0.115289 0.1056438 -1.09 0.276 -0.3229818 0.0924038 
Capital_Domestic 0.0584938 0.0657431 0.89 0.374 -0.0707553 0.1877429 
Capital_Eur 2.014431 0.9225182 2.18 0.030 0.2007859 3.828077 
Loans_Domestic -0.0077023 0.0041321 -1.86 0.063 -0.0158258 0.0004212 
Loans_Eur -0.1566549 0.0588734 -2.66 0.008 -0.2723984 -0.0409113 
CurrAcc 0.0265417 0.0338753 0.78 0.434 -0.0400562 0.0931396 
IntSpread 0.4512844 0.1875962 2.41 0.017 0.0824754 0.8200935 
Survey 2.585868 0.2949616 8.77 0.000 2.005981 3.165754 
Intercept -7.857192 0.8358169 -9.40 0.000 -9.500385 -6.213999 
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6.2 Relationship between the Bank Lending Survey and New Loans 
Considering the strong results of the Survey variable from the previous subsection, it 
becomes necessary to explore its behavior in more details. As a reminder, it is the aggregated 
expectations of the euro area banks about the future development of credit standards applied 
for the approval of new loans to enterprises.  First of all, it is reported by the European 
Central Bank in the beginning of every quarter, in contrast to all other variables under 
consideration that are calculated at the end of the quarter. Thus, by definition it does not 
suffer from the same possible reverse causal relationship that may be present in the 
relationship between change in gross domestic product and the other financial system 
variables. Nevertheless, the transmission mechanism between its change and change in GDP 
is less clear. 
 
The problem with the Euro Area Bank Lending Survey variable is that, even though it 
produces the most significant and straightforward results in all regressions it does not have a 
direct relationship with industrial output. After all, the theoretical model presenter earlier 
implies that the financial industry’s expectations about the future will have a causal impact on 
output, but through the level of new loans. It may be possible that the Survey variable merely 
reflects the general short term expectations about the future economic developments and is 
not really indicative of the banking behavior during the quarter. Thus we have to explore the 
relationship between the value of Survey and the level of new loans for the non-financial 
industry. The later was demonstrated to be significant and does have a direct economic 
relationship with both investments and industrial production.  
  
Nonetheless, the problem with this approach is that it would be naïve to think that the lending 
survey is the only variable that influences lending. That is, we would like to control for other 
developments during the quarter as well, to obtain better-quality results. For the moment, 
however, this is not possible as the Euro Area Bank Lending Survey is available for the past 
28 quarters only. The size of the sample allow us test merely one variable at a time. 
Therefore, the change of loans to firms at time t will be regressed on Survey with lag up to 3 
periods back: ( )t t nLoans f Survey    where (0, 4)n . Vector autoregressive model with 1 
period lag is also applied and Granger causality test was performed on the results of the VAR. 
All results of the regressions and other necessary data are presented below - tables VIII and 
VIV and impulse response function of the variables is given on Figure 6.  
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Table IX 
Bank Lending Survey and New Loans 
 
Variable Coefficient St. Error t P-value R-squared Num Obs 
Survey 1.565047 1.316091 1.19 0.245 0.0516 28 
Intercept -2.772524 3.744931 -0.74 0.466   
Survey L1 3.640751 1.171706 3.11 0.005 0.2786 27 
Intercept -8.596831 3.326732 -2.58 0.016   
Survey L2 5.469339 0.8457763 6.47 0.000 0.6354 26 
Intercept -13.73119 2.400008 -5.72 0.000   
Survey L3 5.950097 0.6553973 9.08 0.000 0.7818 25 
Intercept -15.05401 1.863299 -8.08 0.000   
Survey L4 6.190606 0.7043927 8.79 0.000 0.7783 24 
Intercept -15.78318 2.012031 -7.84 0.000   
 
Table X 
VAR and Granger Causality Test 
 
Equation Parms RMSE R-sq chi2 P>chi2 No. of obs 
loans_euroarea 3 0.767628 0.7606 85.76837 0.0000 27 
survey 3 0.1061 0.7686 89.70357 0.0000  
 
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Z P>|z| 
loans_euroarea     
loans_euroarea L1 0.7655775 0.1038448 7.37 0.000 
Survey L1 2.12647 0.6812443 3.12 0.002 
Const. -5.66054 1.88671 -3.00 0.003 
Survey     
loans_euroarea L1 -0.0393143 .0143532 -2.74 0.006 
Survey L1 0.8917366 0.0941603 9.47 0.000 
Const. 0.3940211 0.2607774 1.51 0.131 
 
Granger Causality Wald tests 
Equation Excluded chi2 df Prob > chi2 
loans_euroarea survey 9.7434 1 0.002 
loans_euroarea ALL 9.7434 1 0.002 
survey loans_euroarea 7.5024 1 0.006 
survey ALL 7.5024 1 0.006 
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Probably the most puzzling result from table VIII is that the level of Survey is not statistically 
significant in the same period regression. This was unexpected since the value of the variable 
exactly reflects the expectations of the banking managers about the lending in the following 3 
months.  A possible explanation of this phenomenon is that it takes time for the relaxing of 
the credit standards to actually transform into a higher amount of new loans. All other 
evidence from the tables actually point into this direction. The coefficient on the Survey 
variable steadily increases and becomes more economically and statistically significant up to 
4 periods in the past. After that it gradually declines, becoming insignificant at 5% around t – 
6. (Graphical representation of this development is shown in the bottom-left corner of Figure 
6 below). The R2 of the regressions also increase steadily from 0,05 in the same period 
regression, to the striking 0,78 in the regression with 3 quarters lag. However, it should be 
noted that in this process some observations are dropped that can amount to 14% of the 
sample size in the case of 4 lags. This gives more weight to the financial crisis years and may 
explain the decreasing standard error on the Survey coefficients, but even with this in mind 
the results are strong.  
  
Figure 8: Impulse Response Function of Loans and 
Survey
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The data from the Vector Autoregressive Model suggests that there are two way statistically 
significant correlations between past observations of Loans and Survey. From an economic 
point of view this is not entirely without grounds, since it is certainly reasonable to believe 
that banking managers take into consideration the recent developments of the lending market 
when trying to make prediction about the future. This is why the Granger causality tests show 
two-way causality. Nevertheless, the coefficients on Loans are hardly economically 
significant, in contrast to the coefficients on Survey. This can be clearly seen on the impulse 
response function on Figure 6. Also not surprisingly there is a considerable autocorrelation in 
both variables, but it is significant only for 2-3 periods back with decreasing coefficients, 
while the impact of Survey on Loans is both larger and more lasting. It is possible that there 
is also a same period effect as predicted, but it is overshadowed by the much stronger lagged 
effects. Nevertheless, from the available statistics can be concluded that the transmission 
mechanism of the theoretical model is at least plausible. Predictions of the banks about future 
lending do materialize as expected and, as explained earlier, lending does have a causal 
impact on aggregate output. However, we cannot entirely refute the hypothesis that Survey 
variable also includes a direct expectation of the developments in GDP. 
 
6.3 Banking Profitability and GDP 
 One of the main goals of this research, from the very beginning, was to test the 
hypothesis that banking losses, or decrease in profits, in a given period will have a significant 
impact on banks’ lending behavior. The simple theoretical model from the previous section 
predicts that new loans in a period t are impacted negatively by the proportion of bad debt 
during the period - 
( ) 0add t
t
dL
d   . The decrease in lending then may create a condition for a 
slower economic growth during the subsequent periods. However, it is virtually impossible to 
test this variable together with the others as there is almost no data on aggregate, quarterly 
profitability of the banks in Europe. One possible resolution would be to go through the 
quarterly financial statements of each bank and aggregate them for each country, but this is 
extremely time consuming and with uncertain quality. Thus, I have used the annual banking 
profitability statistics from the OECD Countries database to test this prediction with a similar 
regression as before: 
( , , , )t t t t tGDP f Profit Capital Loans CurrAcc  .  
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All variables are calculated from OECD statistics for consistency reasons and thus deviate 
somewhat from the variables in the previous section. For example the change in loans is 
calculated directly from the aggregate balance sheet and includes the total amount of loans, 
not only the loans to non-financial corporations, as in the previous subsections.  Even in this 
case data is available only for 16 countries in Europe, even including countries such as Poland 
and Czech Republic that were previously excluded. 
 
The results of the regression are presented in tables X and XI below. Despite the fact that the 
goal was to capture the impact of any sub-prime related losses on GDP, this is currently not 
possible, as data is mostly available only until 2007. Nevertheless, the results allow us to say 
several things about the relationship in general. The current account and the change of loans 
seem to have a statistically significant effect on GDP also on annual basis, although with little 
economic significance. The coefficients on the two variables are respectively only 0,09 and 
0,08 (0,18 and 0,02 lagged one period). The coefficients on capital are even negative, but not 
significant. A possible explanation is that these variables are probably more important in the 
short run, within one or two quarters, rather than annually. It also might be the case that the 
yearly observations of CurrAcc, Loans and Capital are too aggregated and do not show the 
actual development during a given year or there are other variables, not examined here, that 
have more pronounced medium term effect. 
 
The coefficients of the variable under scrutiny in this subsection, Profit, exhibit the same 
characteristics. Although their signs are as predicted, they are barely economically significant 
– 0,05 and 0,08 with one period lag. In addition, the same period Profit is statistically 
significant only at 10%. In any case it would be hard to point out with certainty the direction 
of the causal relationship between GDP and Profit within the period. However, the 
encouraging result here is that the one period lagged Profit has both higher coefficient than 
the same period variable and it is significant at 99% confidence level. In line with this 
outcome and the expectations of the theoretical model, we find that the change in loans is also 
correlated with the 1 period lagged Profit at 99,9% and the coefficient is 0,55, which is a 
strong signal that the nature of the relationship justifies the expectations of the model. 
Nevertheless it would be naïve to conclude only on the basis of these results that banking 
profits or losses have a causal impact on the economic output of a country in future periods. 
The issue deserves further, more through, research, preferably on a smaller time scale. 
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Table XI 
Banking Profitability Regression: 1990 –  2008 
 
Yearly observations of GDP growth rate are regressed on 3 banking specific variables and 1 macroeconomic. Data used is for the period 1990 to 
2008 for the 16 countries for a total of 248 observations (Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland). All data is from the OECD countries data base. The second table 
shows regression of change in loans on profit during the period and with 1 period lag. 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.2247  Number of obs      =       248 
Variable Coefficient St. Error t P-value 95% Confidence 
GDP       
Profit 0.0506426 0.0309818 1.63 0.102 -0.0104075 0.1116927
CurrAcc 0.0935347 0.0351257 2.66 0.008 0.0243189 0.1627505
Capital -0.0571638 0.103997 -0.55 0.583 -0.2620915 0.1477639
Loans 0.0755748 .0109317 6.91 0.000 0.0540337 0.0971159
Intercept 2.250631 0.6457683 3.49 0.001 0.9781341 3.523128 
 
Loans Coefficient St. Error t P-value R-squared Num Obs 
Profit 0.1515477 0.1646847 0.92 0.358 0.0034 267 
Profit L1 0.5517412 0.162235 3.40 0.001 0.0469 252 
 
Table XII 
Banking Profitability Regression: 1990 –  2008 1 Period Lag 
R-sq:  within  = 0.1427   Number of obs      =       246 
Variable Coefficient L1 St. Error t P-value 95% Confidence 
GDP       
Profit 0.0843227 0.0325942 2.59 0.010 0.0200983 0.148547 
CurrAcc 0.1821826 0.0403612 4.51 0.000 0.102654 0.2617112
Capital -0.204621 0.1169227 -1.75 0.081 -0.4350082 0.0257663
Loans 0.0248126 0.0122836 2.02 0.045 0.0006088 0.0490164
Intercept 3.391631 0.7282882 4.66 0.000 1.956595 4.826667 
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6.4 Extensions 
 In addition to the results already presented and discusses earlier in the section, a panel 
vector autoregression model was also performed on all variables to explore the possible 
interdependencies between them. A total of nine equations were estimated with two lags for 
each variable. The outcome of the model is given in Appendix I as it tends to be quite 
voluminous. It would have been much useful to estimate the model for the two periods, 
Normal and Financial Crisis, separately but the small number of observations does not allow 
this for the time being. In our case one equation consists of 19 independent variables and the 
sample size is only 421. The Financial Crisis period takes up almost half of total time period 
in the model. Instead of this, the results of a Granger causality test for the two periods are 
reported in Table XII and give us a strong hint of the potential differences between them.  In 
addition, a graph of the impulse response functions during the financial crisis period with 
response variable GDP is given in Figure 7. Graphs with the other response variables are also 
found in Appendix II. 
 
The VAR model generally confirms the results given by the baseline model earlier in the 
section. The aggregate output of an economy is significantly impacted by the lagged values of 
banking variables such as Eurospread and Survey and their respective signs are mostly in 
line with the expectations. On the other hand the variables that measure the change in loans to 
non-financial companies on domestic and aggregate scale are surprisingly not statistically 
significant. The equation with GDP as a dependent variable has the smallest R-Squared of 
only 0,37 compared to values above 0,80 for all other equations. This is not unexpected and 
comes to show that there is a significant correlation between the financial system variables 
and that even if the theory laid out here is correct, banks cannot completely account for the 
development of the economic conditions. The high correlation between Loans and the other 
banking specific variables, together with the small sample size, may explain why Loans 
appears statistically insignificant in the model. Its R-squared is remarkable 0,91. However the 
result that strongly supports the theoretical background here is that past values of GDP do not 
seem to have a statistically significant correlation with the banking specific variables, with the 
only exception of Eurospread and Capital_Eur. The other non-financial variable, the current 
account balance, also does not seem impact significantly either the financial variables or 
GDP. Thus, the developments of the financial system are more or less endogenous. To 
explore these issues further we have to take a look at the results of the Granger causality test 
below. 
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Table XIII – Granger Causality Test (Excerpt Results) 
   null hypothesis: A -> B 
A does not Granger-cause B 
Normal Period  Financial Crisis 
Obs F-Statistic Probability  Obs F-Statistic Probability 
             
  eurospread -> gdp_qq_vol 494 1,0071 0,3660  190 5,1070 0,0069
  gdp_qq_vol -> eurospread   0,6886 0,5028    56,8619 0,0000
             
  capital_euroarea -> gdp_qq_vol 494 0,8458 0,4298  190 3,6953 0,0267
  gdp_qq_vol -> capital_euroarea   0,9753 0,3778    34,2593 0,0000
             
  capital_domestic -> gdp_qq_vol 428 2,3541 0,0962  180 0,9251 0,3984
  gdp_qq_vol -> capital_domestic   0,4538 0,6355    3,4275 0,0347
             
  loans_euroarea -> gdp_qq_vol 494 0,1755 0,8391  190 2,6291 0,0748
  gdp_qq_vol -> loans_euroarea   3,6721 0,0261    36,0535 0,0000
             
  loans_domestic -> gdp_qq_vol 434 0,1219 0,8853  180 4,6478 0,0108
  gdp_qq_vol -> loans_domestic   0,3277 0,7208    0,9201 0,4004
             
  intspread -> gdp_qq_vol 245 2,5814 0,0778  170 1,4062 0,2480
  gdp_qq_vol -> intspread   0,3123 0,7320    5,5210 0,0048
             
  curracc -> gdp_qq_vol 494 9,9859 0,0001  190 0,3206 0,7261
  gdp_qq_vol -> curracc   3,6524 0,0266    4,8911 0,0085
             
  survey -> gdp_qq_vol 266 0,7827 0,4582  190 45,3027 0,0000
  gdp_qq_vol -> survey   1,8415 0,1606    6,7907 0,0014
             
  capital_euroarea -> eurospread 494 3,2709 0,0388  190 0,0602 0,9416
  eurospread -> capital_euroarea   7,0152 0,0010    75,6490 0,0000
             
  capital_domestic -> eurospread 428 0,1457 0,8644  180 1,0996 0,3353
  eurospread -> capital_domestic   0,3106 0,7332    5,0320 0,0075
             
  loans_euroarea -> eurospread 494 0,3668 0,6932  190 26,0580 0,0000
  eurospread -> loans_euroarea   8,5667 0,0002    29,9839 0,0000
             
  loans_domestic -> eurospread 434 2,2241 0,1094  180 12,4070 0,0000
  eurospread -> loans_domestic   0,6503 0,5224    0,5718 0,5656
             
  intspread -> eurospread 245 5,2399 0,0059  170 7,6790 0,0007
  eurospread -> intspread   0,4172 0,6594    6,0425 0,0029
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Figure 9: Impulse Response Function Excerpt 
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The results of the Granger causality test are reported in two columns for the two different time 
periods in Table XII. The first thing to notice is the differences between the effects of the 
current account on GDP during the normal period and the financial crisis. From the baseline 
model we have established that CurrAcc is one of the most significant variables in the model, 
which is not surprising as the European economies are relatively open and the trade balance 
enters directly into the calculation of GDP.  We see than during the normal period CurrAcc 
Granger-causes GDP and vice-versa, but during the financial crisis this is no longer the case. 
Only GDP affects the variable and the current account loses its predicting abilities. This is 
especially evident on the bottom left corner of impulse response functions during the financial 
crisis in Figure 6. Usually we would expect that at the beginning of a global slump the 
contagion will spread from the affected economies to healthy ones through trade. If we make 
the reasonable assumption that at the beginning of the recent recession the European 
economies were in fact ‘healthy’, with some degree of certainty we can say that the spillover 
effect did not come through the typical channels, as all results point in this direction. 
Although a circumstantial evidence, this supports the hypothesis that banks not only 
contributed to the recession in Europe by the usual financial accelerator and liquidity spiral 
effects, but had a large part in causing it.  
  
At the same time, the other results of the Granger causality test directly support this 
proposition. All banking specific variables are insignificant during the normal period, but 
Granger-cause GDP during the financial crisis period at very high significance levels.  This is 
especially evident for EuroSpread, Capital and Survey. Even the Loans that had no 
significant results in the vector autoresgression Granger-causes GDP at 90% for the aggregate 
variable. This once again supports the notion of a transmission mechanism of shocks from the 
financial industry to the real economy through the supply of new loans. Moreover we see that 
the aggregate output also has a considerable causal impact on the financial system, in contrast 
to the results of the VAR model. During normal times this occurrence is self explanatory as it 
should be the regular direction of the causal relationship, but during the recession it may be an 
evidence of multiplier effect. On the other hand, we also observe strong two-way causality 
between almost all of the banking specific variables, which confirms the results of the VAR. 
The correlation between them is a sign for simultaneous processes in the financial system, 
especially during the period of the financial crisis. Although we are not able to disentangle 
these processes at the moment, the overall results of the test give considerable support to the 
propositions about the role of banks in the economic problems in Europe during 2007-2009.  
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7. Conclusion 
 This paper presents a theoretical model of the transmission of a shock from the 
financial system to the overall economy and tests the suggested effects on European 
macroeconomic data in the period 2000-2009. The rationale for the existence of such a 
transmission mechanism and its procyclical effects on economic activity are deeply rooted in 
previous research on the topics of financial crises and recessions. The high level of 
development of the financial system is one of the preconditions for long term growth, but 
during financial turbulence its action may be in fact harmful for the other economic subjects. 
Therefore, financial deepening should not be the sole motive for deregulations and should 
never happen at the expense of more fragile and risky financial system. Indeed, it ought to be 
closely connected to the efficiency of intermediation through the economic cycle.  
 
Due to the high level of leverage in the financial system, any sudden increase in losses may 
lead to rapid deleveraging through decreasing lending or selling assets. At the same time, 
leverage and liquidity have a two way causal relationship. Thus, deleveraging may lead to 
liquidity spirals in which the prices of assets continue to fall and banks are unable to obtain 
short-term financing to roll their debts, inducing further assets fire sales. This is basically 
what happened during the financial crisis, which transferred to Europe despite the fact that the 
region was not prone to the same macroeconomic imbalances as the country of origin. 
Nowadays the financial system is greatly globalized and a shock in one place is felt 
immediately all over the world. At the same time, when the banks are concerned about their 
future access to liquidity, they cut back on lending to the real economy to conserve capital. In 
this way, a pure financial crisis can develop into a full scale global recession. 
 
The results of the empirical section of the paper show that a shock to the perceived risk in the 
financial system does affect negatively the aggregate economic activity during the same 
period and in the future periods. Moreover, the expectations of the banking managers about 
the future state of the economy may turn into self-fulfilling prophecies. Both effects happen 
mostly through the lending channel to non-financial corporations. Also as expected, there is a 
positive correlation between the capital in the banking system and economic growth. During 
bad times it absorbs the shocks to the system and limits the deleveraging. Surprisingly, banks 
did not widen the interest spread between deposits and loans to account for the higher risk 
premium during the crisis. At the end, results show that the recession in Europe was most 
probably “imported” through the financial system and its procyclical effects on the economy.     
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8. Appendices 
Appendix I: Vector Autoregression Estimates 
Sample (adjusted): 174 199 
 Included observations: 421 after adjustments 
GDP_QQ_VOL EUROSPREAD CAPITAL_EUR CAPITAL_DOM  LOANS_EUR LOANS_DOM INTSPREAD CURRACC SURVEY 
GDP_QQ_VOL(‐1)   0.005241  ‐0.123161  ‐0.012577  ‐0.001305  ‐0.000120   0.120621  ‐0.020943  ‐0.055488 ‐0.010110 
Standard errors  (0.05061)   (0.01873)   (0.00286)   (0.02188)   (0.02208)   (0.73637)   (0.00765)   (0.07176)  (0.00419) 
t-statistics [ 0.10356]  [‐6.57525]  [‐4.39440]  [‐0.05964]  [‐0.00544]  [ 0.16381]  [‐2.73887]  [‐0.77327] [‐2.41336] 
GDP_QQ_VOL(‐2)   0.090218  ‐0.026645  ‐0.008417  ‐0.021213   0.029648   0.281148   0.003214  ‐0.098795 ‐0.001408 
Standard errors  (0.05295)   (0.01960)   (0.00299)   (0.02289)   (0.02310)   (0.77042)   (0.00800)   (0.07508)  (0.00438) 
t-statistics [ 1.70386]  [‐1.35962]  [‐2.81108]  [‐0.92682]  [ 1.28326]  [ 0.36493]  [ 0.40180]  [‐1.31593] [‐0.32120] 
EUROSPREAD(‐1)   ‐0.318636   0.927867   0.078587   0.075543  ‐0.219739   0.737768   0.021025   0.127061   0.037355 
Standard errors  (0.13403)   (0.04961)   (0.00758)   (0.05794)   (0.05848)   (1.95016)   (0.02025)   (0.19004)  (0.01109) 
t-statistics [‐ 2.37735]  [ 18.7046]  [ 10.3684]  [ 1.30390]  [‐3.75733]  [ 0.37831]  [ 1.03823]  [ 0.66860] [ 3.36701] 
EUROSPREAD(‐2)  ‐0.499995  ‐0.211729  ‐0.031227  ‐0.093269  ‐0.207657   1.775056  ‐0.006351   0.235024  ‐0.043433 
Standard errors  (0.15049)   (0.05570)   (0.00851)   (0.06505)   (0.06567)   (2.18968)   (0.02274)   (0.21338)  (0.01246) 
t-statistics [‐3.32242]  [‐3.80130]  [‐3.66933]  [‐1.43376]  [‐3.16235]  [ 0.81065]  [‐0.27932]  [ 1.10143] [‐3.48667] 
CAPITAL_EUROAREA(‐1)   0.358374   0.605006   0.041987   0.153827   1.847423  ‐2.805226   0.157697   0.478126   0.196617 
Standard errors  (0.84915)   (0.31428)   (0.04802)   (0.36706)   (0.37052)   (12.3553)   (0.12830)   (1.20400)  (0.07029) 
t-statistics [ 0.42204]  [ 1.92504]  [ 0.87437]  [ 0.41908]  [ 4.98606]  [‐0.22705]  [ 1.22915]  [ 0.39711] [ 2.79729] 
CAPITAL_EUROAREA(‐2)   0.602784   1.057697  ‐0.272161   0.105393   1.623674  ‐0.065795   0.193898  ‐0.811554  0.021219 
Standard errors  (0.88492)   (0.32752)   (0.05004)   (0.38252)   (0.38613)   (12.8757)   (0.13370)   (1.25472)  (0.07325) 
t-statistics [ 0.68118]  [ 3.22941]  [‐5.43856]  [ 0.27552]  [ 4.20505]  [‐0.00511]  [ 1.45023]  [‐0.64680] [ 0.28969] 
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CAPITAL_DOMESTIC(‐1)  ‐0.016743  ‐0.011051   0.000653   0.963091   0.019541   1.557954  ‐0.021868  ‐0.080120 ‐0.010214 
Standard errors  (0.11840)   (0.04382)   (0.00670)   (0.05118)   (0.05166)   (1.72278)   (0.01789)   (0.16788)  (0.00980) 
t-statistics [‐0.14141]  [‐0.25218]  [ 0.09755]  [ 18.8172]  [ 0.37823]  [ 0.90432]  [‐1.22240]  [‐0.47724] [‐1.04214] 
CAPITAL_DOMESTIC(‐2)   0.011521   0.007102  ‐8.42E‐05   0.025662  ‐0.023053  ‐1.515988   0.029818   0.101453   0.009812 
Standard errors  (0.11869)   (0.04393)   (0.00671)   (0.05131)   (0.05179)   (1.72699)   (0.01793)   (0.16829)  (0.00982) 
t-statistics [ 0.09707]  [ 0.16167]  [‐0.01255]  [ 0.50017]  [‐0.44512]  [‐0.87782]  [ 1.66273]  [ 0.60284] [ 0.99866] 
LOANS_EUROAREA(‐1)   0.050519  ‐0.050806  ‐0.007428  ‐0.032935   0.087272   1.613318  ‐0.000705  ‐0.036803  0.018172 
Standard errors  (0.07981)   (0.02954)   (0.00451)   (0.03450)   (0.03482)   (1.16122)   (0.01206)   (0.11316)  (0.00661) 
t-statistics [ 0.63301]  [‐1.72001]  [‐1.64594]  [‐0.95467]  [ 2.50614]  [ 1.38933]  [‐0.05847]  [‐0.32524] [ 2.75082] 
LOANS_EUROAREA(‐2)  ‐0.063167   0.054373   0.008696   0.014812   0.457152  ‐0.414044   0.000696   0.011050  ‐0.066863 
Standard errors  (0.06936)   (0.02567)   (0.00392)   (0.02998)   (0.03026)   (1.00915)   (0.01048)   (0.09834)  (0.00574) 
t-statistics [‐0.91075]  [ 2.11816]  [ 2.21726]  [ 0.49406]  [ 15.1059]  [‐0.41029]  [ 0.06638]  [ 0.11237] [‐11.6465] 
LOANS_DOMESTIC(‐1)  ‐0.006005  ‐0.004789  ‐0.000385   0.000946   0.000400  ‐0.239051  ‐0.000935  ‐0.009527 ‐0.000650 
Standard errors  (0.00392)   (0.00145)   (0.00022)   (0.00169)   (0.00171)   (0.05703)   (0.00059)   (0.00556)  (0.00032) 
t-statistics [‐1.53184]  [‐3.30127]  [‐1.73854]  [ 0.55855]  [ 0.23391]  [‐4.19132]  [‐1.57800]  [‐1.71420] [‐2.00428] 
LOANS_DOMESTIC(‐2)  ‐0.005287   0.001767   8.69E‐05  ‐0.001556   2.66E‐05  ‐0.033243  ‐0.000141  ‐0.004442 ‐0.000371 
Standard errors  (0.00402)   (0.00149)   (0.00023)   (0.00174)   (0.00176)   (0.05856)   (0.00061)   (0.00571)  (0.00033) 
t-statistics [‐1.31368]  [ 1.18594]  [ 0.38187]  [‐0.89429]  [ 0.01516]  [‐0.56764]  [‐0.23184]  [‐0.77839] [‐1.11271] 
INTSPREAD(‐1)   0.256281  ‐0.498335   0.024522   0.051626   0.108431   0.526947   0.977050  ‐0.808308 ‐0.013443 
Standard errors  (0.34012)   (0.12588)   (0.01923)   (0.14702)   (0.14841)   (4.94881)   (0.05139)   (0.48225)  (0.02815) 
t-statistics [ 0.75350]  [‐3.95870]  [ 1.27491]  [ 0.35115]  [ 0.73063]  [ 0.10648]  [ 19.0130]  [‐1.67611] [‐0.47749] 
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INTSPREAD(‐2)  ‐0.123184   0.395313  ‐0.022995  ‐0.036313  ‐0.138851  ‐1.034713  ‐0.018837   0.841129   0.014667 
Standard errors  (0.34459)   (0.12754)   (0.01949)   (0.14896)   (0.15036)   (5.01389)   (0.05206)   (0.48859)  (0.02852) 
t-statistics [‐0.35748]  [ 3.09956]  [‐1.18000]  [‐0.24378]  [‐0.92346]  [‐0.20637]  [‐0.36181]  [ 1.72153] [ 0.51420] 
CURRACC(‐1)  ‐0.008222   0.018695   0.001411   0.020025  ‐0.013285  ‐0.062450   0.000527  ‐0.402801  0.001205 
Standard errors  (0.03479)   (0.01288)   (0.00197)   (0.01504)   (0.01518)   (0.50626)   (0.00526)   (0.04933)  (0.00288) 
t-statistics [‐0.23632]  [ 1.45173]  [ 0.71729]  [ 1.33144]  [‐0.87507]  [‐0.12336]  [ 0.10028]  [‐8.16474] [ 0.41824] 
CURRACC(‐2)   0.019275   0.011768  ‐0.001533  ‐0.001802   0.001512  ‐0.057592   0.000844  ‐0.034698  0.004799 
Standard errors  (0.03418)   (0.01265)   (0.00193)   (0.01478)   (0.01492)   (0.49738)   (0.00516)   (0.04847)  (0.00283) 
t-statistics [ 0.56385]  [ 0.93013]  [‐0.79299]  [‐0.12192]  [ 0.10135]  [‐0.11579]  [ 0.16348]  [‐0.71587] [ 1.69598] 
SURVEY(‐1)   4.118022   0.117577   0.001781   0.173510  ‐0.828118   10.66420   0.247797   0.043759   0.856078 
Standard errors  (0.55085)   (0.20388)   (0.03115)   (0.23811)   (0.24036)   (8.01497)   (0.08323)   (0.78105)  (0.04560) 
t-statistics [ 7.47576]  [ 0.57670]  [ 0.05719]  [ 0.72869]  [‐3.44535]  [ 1.33054]  [ 2.97734]  [ 0.05603] [ 18.7750] 
SURVEY(‐2)  ‐0.975292  ‐0.833602   0.045053  ‐0.126337   4.431905  ‐11.71562  ‐0.253218   0.013831   0.025586 
Standard errors  (0.64149)   (0.23742)   (0.03628)   (0.27729)   (0.27991)   (9.33375)   (0.09692)   (0.90956)  (0.05310) 
t-statistics [‐1.52036]  [‐3.51104]  [ 1.24194]  [‐0.45561]  [ 15.8335]  [‐1.25519]  [‐2.61260]  [ 0.01521] [ 0.48186] 
C  ‐8.750757   2.500011  ‐0.144216  ‐0.032156  ‐9.233015   3.639311   0.013616  ‐0.416401  0.449056 
Standard errors  (0.99576)   (0.36854)   (0.05631)   (0.43043)   (0.43449)   (14.4885)   (0.15045)   (1.41188)  (0.08242) 
t-statistics [‐8.78803]  [ 6.78347]  [‐2.56106]  [‐0.07471]  [‐21.2502]  [ 0.25119]  [ 0.09050]  [‐0.29493] [ 5.44813] 
 R‐squared   0.369059   0.873216   0.553631   0.970028   0.913011   0.070051   0.946579   0.193484   0.834594 
 Adj. R‐squared   0.340808   0.867539   0.533644   0.968686   0.909116   0.028412   0.944187   0.157371   0.827188 
 F‐statistic   13.06355   153.8190   27.70001   722.7979   234.4040   1.682324   395.7305   5.357774   112.6883 
 Log likelihood  ‐607.7054  ‐189.2553   601.6662  ‐254.6063  ‐258.5564  ‐1734.977   187.9345  ‐754.7065  441.2704 
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Appendix II: Granger Causality Test 
 
   null hypothesis: A -> B 
A does not Granger-cause B 
Normal Period   Financial Crisis 
Obs F-Statistic Probability  Obs F-Statistic Probability 
             
  eurospread -> gdp_qq_vol 494 1,0071 0,3660   190 5,1070 0,0069
  gdp_qq_vol -> eurospread   0,6886 0,5028     56,8619 0,0000
             
  capital_euroarea -> gdp_qq_vol 494 0,8458 0,4298   190 3,6953 0,0267
  gdp_qq_vol -> capital_euroarea   0,9753 0,3778     34,2593 0,0000
             
  capital_domestic -> gdp_qq_vol 428 2,3541 0,0962   180 0,9251 0,3984
  gdp_qq_vol -> capital_domestic   0,4538 0,6355     3,4275 0,0347
             
  loans_euroarea -> gdp_qq_vol 494 0,1755 0,8391   190 2,6291 0,0748
  gdp_qq_vol -> loans_euroarea   3,6721 0,0261     36,0535 0,0000
             
  loans_domestic -> gdp_qq_vol 434 0,1219 0,8853   180 4,6478 0,0108
  gdp_qq_vol -> loans_domestic   0,3277 0,7208     0,9201 0,4004
             
  intspread -> gdp_qq_vol 245 2,5814 0,0778   170 1,4062 0,2480
  gdp_qq_vol -> intspread   0,3123 0,7320     5,5210 0,0048
             
  curracc -> gdp_qq_vol 494 9,9859 0,0001   190 0,3206 0,7261
  gdp_qq_vol -> curracc   3,6524 0,0266     4,8911 0,0085
             
  survey -> gdp_qq_vol 266 0,7827 0,4582   190 45,3027 0,0000
  gdp_qq_vol -> survey   1,8415 0,1606     6,7907 0,0014
             
  capital_euroarea -> eurospread 494 3,2709 0,0388   190 0,0602 0,9416
  eurospread -> capital_euroarea   7,0152 0,0010     75,6490 0,0000
             
  capital_domestic -> eurospread 428 0,1457 0,8644   180 1,0996 0,3353
  eurospread -> capital_domestic   0,3106 0,7332     5,0320 0,0075
             
  loans_euroarea -> eurospread 494 0,3668 0,6932   190 26,0580 0,0000
  eurospread -> loans_euroarea   8,5667 0,0002     29,9839 0,0000
             
  loans_domestic -> eurospread 434 2,2241 0,1094   180 12,4070 0,0000
  eurospread -> loans_domestic   0,6503 0,5224     0,5718 0,5656
             
  intspread -> eurospread 245 5,2399 0,0059   170 7,6790 0,0007
  eurospread -> intspread   0,4172 0,6594     6,0425 0,0029
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  curracc -> eurospread 494 3,4957 0,0311   190 0,2806 0,7557
  eurospread -> curracc   0,6142 0,5415     5,9686 0,0031
             
  survey -> eurospread 266 3,5598 0,0298   190 55,5244 0,0000
  eurospread -> survey   18,0633 0,0000     30,4944 0,0000
             
  capital_domestic -> capital_euroarea 428 0,0688 0,9335   180 1,3295 0,2673
  capital_euroarea -> capital_domestic   0,2225 0,8006     2,1812 0,1160
             
  loans_euroarea -> capital_euroarea 494 24,8517 0,0000   190 81,6050 0,0000
  capital_euroarea -> loans_euroarea   4,8241 0,0084     98,6744 0,0000
             
  loans_domestic -> capital_euroarea 434 3,0378 0,0490   180 5,0252 0,0076
  capital_euroarea -> loans_domestic   1,0836 0,3393     0,1765 0,8384
             
  intspread -> capital_euroarea 245 0,7708 0,4638   170 3,8427 0,0234
  capital_euroarea -> intspread   0,3841 0,6815     6,4360 0,0020
             
  curracc -> capital_euroarea 494 0,5323 0,5876   190 2,8915 0,0580
  capital_euroarea -> curracc   2,0869 0,1252     2,9672 0,0539
             
  survey -> capital_euroarea 266 24,2837 0,0000   190 144,0360 0,0000
  capital_euroarea -> survey   78,7753 0,0000     62,5895 0,0000
             
  loans_euroarea -> capital_domestic 428 0,9705 0,3797   180 4,5245 0,0121
  capital_domestic -> loans_euroarea   0,0149 0,9852     2,0755 0,1286
             
  loans_domestic -> capital_domestic 400 0,8736 0,4182   170 3,6288 0,0287
  capital_domestic -> loans_domestic   1,5154 0,2210     0,8444 0,4317
             
  intspread -> capital_domestic 245 0,1141 0,8922   170 1,9758 0,1419
  capital_domestic -> intspread   1,8667 0,1569     2,2860 0,1049
             
  curracc -> capital_domestic 428 0,3785 0,6851   180 1,1030 0,3342
  capital_domestic -> curracc   0,3064 0,7363     0,9374 0,3936
             
  survey -> capital_domestic 236 0,6884 0,5034   180 4,5671 0,0117
  capital_domestic -> survey   0,1757 0,8390     0,3901 0,6776
             
  loans_domestic -> loans_euroarea 434 0,8245 0,4392   180 0,3848 0,6812
  loans_euroarea -> loans_domestic   0,6952 0,4995     0,0928 0,9114
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  intspread -> loans_euroarea 245 2,8959 0,0572   170 1,8734 0,1569
  loans_euroarea -> intspread   0,4492 0,6387     7,2698 0,0009
             
  curracc -> loans_euroarea 494 0,1512 0,8597   190 0,6909 0,5024
  loans_euroarea -> curracc   0,7761 0,4608     7,2622 0,0009
             
  survey -> loans_euroarea 266 87,0759 0,0000   190 577,3690 0,0000
  loans_euroarea -> survey   35,5406 0,0000     111,7170 0,0000
             
  intspread -> loans_domestic 245 0,1152 0,8913   170 0,9971 0,3712
  loans_domestic -> intspread   0,3975 0,6724     3,8436 0,0234
             
  curracc -> loans_domestic 434 0,4125 0,6623   180 0,4557 0,6347
  loans_domestic -> curracc   0,1992 0,8194     1,0114 0,3658
             
  survey -> loans_domestic 242 0,3000 0,7411   180 3,2862 0,0397
  loans_domestic -> survey   0,0751 0,9277     0,3694 0,6917
             
  curracc -> intspread 245 0,2454 0,7826   170 1,1802 0,3098
  intspread -> curracc   0,0204 0,9798     0,2158 0,8061
             
  survey -> intspread 217 2,7391 0,0669   170 10,9220 0,0000
  intspread -> survey   0,9061 0,4057     0,8479 0,4302
             
  survey -> curracc 266 0,1225 0,8848   190 6,1963 0,0025
  curracc -> survey   0,3807 0,6838     3,5185 0,0316
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Appendix 3: Additional Robustness Tests 
 
Figure 10: Unemployment, Full Model Regression 
 
Fixed-effects (within) 
regression 
Number of obs      =       455 
Group variable: countryid Number of groups   =        17 
R-sq:  within  = 0.2560 Obs per group: avg =      26.8 
 
 
Variable Coefficient St. Error t P-value 
Unemployment     
EuroSpread 0.1579115 0.0935735 1.69 0.092 
Capital_Domestic -0.0327926 0.0647815 -0.51 0.613 
Capital_Eur -0.2253188 0.8922037 -0.25 0.801 
Loans_Domestic -0.0054821 0.0037494 -1.46 0.144 
Loans_Eur -0.3693794 0.0570285 -6.48 0.000 
CurrAcc 0.0605442 0.0341134 1.77 0.077 
IntSpread -0.2524534 0.17671 -1.43 0.154 
Survey 1.516692 0.2894313 5.24 0.000 
Intercept 3.989404 0.8254109 4.83 0.000 
 
 
Figure 11: Unemployment, 1 Period Lag 
 
Fixed-effects (within) 
regression 
Number of obs      =       438 
Group variable: countryid Number of groups   =        17 
R-sq:  within  = 0.2594 Obs per group: avg =      25.8 
 
 
Variable Coefficient L1 St. Error t P-value 
Unemployment      
EuroSpread 0.1971486 0.1030477 1.91 0.056 
Capital_Domestic -0.091715 0.0669069 -1.37 0.171 
Capital_Eur -0.0976589 0.9162136 -0.11 0.915 
Loans_Domestic -0.0077912 0.0042203 -1.85 0.066 
Loans_Eur -0.3952815 0.0590288 -6.70 0.000 
CurrAcc 0.0764954 0.0348415 2.20 0.029 
IntSpread -0.2366781 0.18563 -1.27 0.203 
Survey 0.5958978 0.3011737 1.98 0.049 
Intercept 7.082095 0.858204 8.25 0.000 
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Figure 12: Industrial Production, Full Model Regression 
 
 
Fixed-effects (within) 
regression 
Number of obs      =       455 
Group variable: countryid Number of groups   =        17 
R-sq:  within  = 0.3118 Obs per group: avg =      26.8 
 
 
Variable Coefficient St. Error t P-value 
Industrial Product     
EuroSpread 0.0026151 0.1932695 0.01 0.989 
Capital_Domestic 0.3423991 0.1338015 2.56 0.011 
Capital_Eur 4.174088 1.842783 2.27 0.024 
Loans_Domestic 0.0109877 0.0077441 1.42 0.157 
Loans_Eur 0.3892962 0.1177884 3.31 0.001 
CurrAcc -0.0168746 0.0704588 -0.24 0.811 
IntSpread 1.666382 0.3649819 4.57 0.000 
Survey 5.090864 0.5977997 8.52 0.000 
Intercept -20.88834 1.704827 -12.25 0.000 
 
 
Figure 13: Industrial Production, 1 Period Lag 
 
Fixed-effects (within) 
regression 
Number of obs      =       438 
Group variable: countryid Number of groups   =        17 
R-sq:  within  = 0.2594 Obs per group: avg =      25.8 
 
 
Variable Coefficient L1 St. Error t P-value 
Industrial Product     
EuroSpread 0.5375632 0.2123154 2.53 0.012 
Capital_Domestic 0.2616471 0.1378523 1.90 0.058 
Capital_Eur 0.7961323 1.88773 0.42 0.673 
Loans_Domestic -0.0063117 0.0086954 -0.73 0.468 
Loans_Eur 0.0858273 0.1216206 0.71 0.481 
CurrAcc 0.2214451 0.0717861 3.08 0.002 
IntSpread 1.301861 0.3824646 3.40 0.001 
Survey 6.285332 0.6205263 10.13 0.000 
Intercept -22.65879 1.768209 -12.81 0.000 
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